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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Abstract The introductory chapter offers a detailed description of the 
themes that the reader can expect to find in this book, and a discussion of 
the social and academic relevance of the role and use of forensic genetic 
technologies in the criminal justice system. This introductory chapter pro-
vides the key concepts for the discussion of how developments in the 
application of forensic genetics can be understood as part of wider shifts in 
how the governance of criminality is enacted and made visible through the 
symbolic power invested in science and technology.
Keywords Governance of crime • Forensic genetics • DNA
The Role of GeneTics in cRime GoveRnance
Wherever it goes, the human body leaves traces behind: hair, saliva and 
other fluids, footprints and so on. Body’s materiality has been a key part of 
criminal investigations throughout history. The central role of the human 
body as the basis to identify authors of crimes has gained different shapes 
in the last 35  years, as forensic science became more commonplace in 
criminal justice systems.
Forensic science comprises a set of scientific disciplines and methodolo-
gies, whose goal is to help police-judicial procedures and activities. Among 
others, we can mention forensic toxicology, psychiatry and forensic psy-
chology, anthropology and forensic odontology, criminalistics, biology 
and forensic genetics. This book will pay special attention to the last scien-
2tific discipline. Forensic genetics aims to identify with the greatest possible 
precision the biological origin of a sample, to help the justice system 
address and solve civil and criminal cases.
One of the most notable aspects of the use of forensic genetics in the 
field of criminal investigation is the ability to extract DNA profiles—a bio-
logical structure considered unique for every individual—from the sam-
ples collected at crime scenes or obtained from the bodies of people 
identified in the criminal investigation (e.g., suspects). This genetic infor-
mation, if considered relevant by the professionals involved in the specific 
criminal investigation, may produce genetic evidence, which will subse-
quently be assessed in a court of criminal justice. This book proposes a 
sociological approach to the role and place of forensic genetics in the gov-
ernance of crime in contemporary societies.
The concept governance of crime intends to highlight assumptions, 
discourses and strategies that shape this social sphere. The governance of 
crime encapsulates more than the social response to crime. It also incorpo-
rates new ways to monitor and control behaviours, as well as reconfigured 
forms to apply justice, which co-construct new concepts of order and 
social control (Garland, 2001). The concept of governance of crime will 
be, therefore, used throughout this book to show how the strategies 
applied to social groups considered as risky have gained a more managerial 
and less transformative tone (Feeley & Simon, 1992). We will frame in this 
context the growing, more expansive way that biometric technologies, in 
particular forensic genetics, have been applied to strategies pertaining to 
the governance of crime. By collecting, storing, exchanging and using 
genetic data on a large scale, new systems of social sorting are promoted 
and instituted (Lyon, 2002). These technological systems do not just act 
upon individuals, they create growingly elaborate ways, in terms of impact 
and reach, to monitor and control particular individuals and specific social 
groups. Finally, this concept also makes it possible to look beyond the way 
State structures govern current societies, in order to include other social 
institutions that also constitute the backbone of the governance of crime 
in contemporary societies. Such is the case of the networks producing 
scientific knowledge, making visible the symbolic power invested in sci-
ence and technology. This also extends to non-governmental organiza-
tions, private companies, media, civil society and many others.
In current societies, genetics has an aura of objectivity, of being able to 
produce “certainties” and “truths” (Nelkin & Lindee, 1995). Such 
notions are interesting to explore in order to understand the crime gover-
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3nance aspects from a sociological point of view (Wilson-Kovacs, 2014). 
They reflect, among others, public perceptions of science and technology, 
crime and justice, as well as the relationship of trust (or lack thereof) 
between the citizen, the State and various prominent modern institutions. 
One of the reasons explaining the importance given to genetic informa-
tion in criminal investigations is the scientific statute of molecular genetics 
(Lynch, Cole, McNally, & Jordan, 2008). From the perspective of several 
professional groups, from forensic scientists to criminal investigators, 
judges and prosecutors, attorneys and the general public, DNA technolo-
gies and forensic genetic databases allegedly generate “more scientific” 
information, “more capable” to identify offenders in a quick and credible 
way (Aas, 2006; Lynch, 2003; Lynch et al., 2008; Machado & Prainsack, 
2012). As such, many commentators have emphasized that the presence 
of genetic technologies such as DNA profiling in policing and as forensic 
evidence in courts can improve the efficiency of the criminal justice system.
However, critical commentators have also speculated about the dis-
criminatory potential of genetic technologies in the justice system, and the 
risks associated with their presumed infallibility in the identification of 
offenders. In this regard, social sciences have been especially critical about 
the social implications and policies deriving from genetic technologies 
bearing an exceptional status of complete ontological and mathematical 
certainty in contemporary societies (Hindmarsh & Prainsack, 2010; 
Kruse, 2016; Williams & Johnson, 2008). This “genetization” of social 
life (Heath, Rapp, & Taussig, 2004; Novas & Rose, 2000; Rabinow, 
1996; Rose, 2007; Rose & Novas, 2005; Rouvroy, 2008; Wehling, 2011; 
Weiner, Martin, Richards, & Tutton, 2017) and the subsequent “geneti-
zation” of criminal investigations follow the determinations of what 
Theodore Porter (1995), North American science historian, designated as 
“mechanical objectivity”. Porter proposed this term to refer to the grow-
ing authority and symbolical power of “impersonal numbers” and statis-
tics in various social, political and economic spheres, in detriment of 
human experiences and assessments (considered “subjective”).
This book portrays, under a critical sociological perspective, contempo-
rary ways of reformulating the governance of crime through genetics. 
Such analysis is linked to a reflection of how the control of information 
flow and the management of inclusion and exclusion circuits is based upon 
calculations and risk prediction. It is important to note that this book 
presents itself as a critical reflection regarding the general enthusiasm 
shown towards the potential that genetics seemingly have to search and 
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4identify authors of crimes. In other words, beyond evaluating the 
 plausibility of applying genetics to support criminal investigations and the 
operation of the justice system, the authors of this publication intend to 
question the social, cultural, political and ethical implications of using 
genetics in the field of the governance of crime.
Some questions addressed in this book are the following: What are the 
main trends of governance of crime in contemporary society through the 
lens of scientific knowledge and genetic technology? What place and role 
do genetics occupy in the criminal justice system? How can classical and 
contemporary social theory help to address current challenges posed by 
the social processes and interactions generated by the uses, meanings and 
expectations attributed to genetics in the governance of crime? Which 
methods and research techniques can be used by students and scholars to 
address some crucial aspects of this particular social reality? Which new 
challenges emerge from the recent paradigm shift within forensic genetics, 
moving from the construction of evidence to be presented in court to the 
production of intelligence to guide the course of a particular criminal 
investigation?
Book oveRview
The scientific breakthroughs that have made it possible to use DNA as a 
tool of human identification began in the 1980s of the twentieth century. 
The first patent that would originate the modern processes of DNA profile 
extraction was registered by the biologist Jeffrey Glassberg (US) in 1983, 
and would subsequently be used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI). In the UK, the biologist Alec Jeffreys from the University of 
Leicester developed a method to extract DNA profiles in late 1984. The 
first criminal case solved by this technique was the rape and murder of two 
teenagers, which took place from 1983 to 1986  in Narborough, 
Leicestershire (England). This criminal case gained widespread coverage, 
both because it involved a technological breakthrough and due to the 
circumstances of the investigation. The criminal investigators asked for 
blood samples of about 5000 men residing in the geographical area around 
the crime scene. The goal was to perform DNA analysis, which eventually 
exonerated a first suspect who had already confessed to the crimes. 
Afterwards, blood was collected from another man—Colin Pitchfork—
and it was found that his genetic profile matched the DNA found in the 
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5crime scene. In other words, this individual was identified as the one 
responsible for both crimes following an analysis of DNA profiles.
This and other success stories have contributed to disseminate social 
representations that characterize DNA technologies as “crime fighting 
heroes”, a kind of “truth machines” promising to remove judicial errors 
from the equation and sentence the authors of crime (Lynch et al., 2008). 
However, these assumptions forgo the necessarily complex and varied 
understanding of social reality. The second chapter of this book will pres-
ent a systematization of the approach taken by sociology and other social 
sciences that aim to critically discuss the widespread success stories of 
DNA technologies. These stories have grown to be more common in soci-
eties ruled by the mystique associated with genes, reflecting and reproduc-
ing social processes involving relationships of power, knowledge, 
hierarchization and social inequalities.
The consolidation of the role of genetics in social life has also invigo-
rated old discussions about the role played by biological and biosocial 
approaches aiming to explain and predict violent and criminal behaviour 
(Duster, 2003). By extension, this type of debate raises issues linked to 
biological determinism, in a way that might lead to promote renewed 
insight and initiatives focused on matters of social exclusion, marginaliza-
tion and stigmatization. As such, there is the need to undertake a historical 
and sociological overview of the biological explanations for anti-social, 
violent and criminal behaviour. Therefore, the third chapter of this book 
aims to provide a detailed description of the seminal work by Lombroso 
(nineteenth century) and highlights the risks of biological determinism 
and potential stigmatization raised by this line of research. It then dis-
cusses current trends of biologization and genetization of crime, by focus-
ing on the specific studies in the fields of neurobiology and epigenetics.
State governance strategies have been fostered based upon DNA poten-
tial for individualization. They are supported by a rhetoric that celebrates 
the efficiency and infallibility of science and technology. At the same time, 
they reduce the space allowed for criticism or dissonant voices which do 
not follow the values and ideologies of the dominant social order. Taking 
a critical perspective of this scenario, the fourth chapter of this book 
describes and systematizes the approaches of social sciences to the pres-
ence of DNA evidence in court.
A significant number of studies undertaken since the mid-90s of the 
twentieth century, mainly in the US, have addressed the social implica-
tions and the transformations in professional cultures and practices stem-
1 INTRODUCTION 
6ming from the presence of DNA technologies in the criminal justice 
system. Such contributions highlight the way DNA technologies shape 
new ways of governance of crime with profound implications thereof in 
the social structure, citizen rights and democratic dynamics in current 
societies.
The substantial potential of the DNA profiling methods created and 
developed in the US and the UK at the tail-end of the 80s to support the 
identification of authors of crimes led to efforts by law enforcement 
authorities in the following decade to develop ways to add the genetic 
profiles of people with criminal records to computerized databases. 
Therefore, 1995 saw the creation of the first criminal database featuring 
genetic profiles on a national context: the UK National Criminal 
Intelligence DNA Database. Other countries have started processes to 
create their own national genetic databases. Namely, and to cite the largest 
databases currently existing in Europe, Austria and the Netherlands started 
theirs in 1997, Germany in 1998 and France in 2001.
A database of DNA profiles is constituted by a structured set of DNA 
profile files and personal data profiles, which can be accessed according to 
the predetermined legislation in effect in each country. These databases 
involve the collection, storage and use of genetic profiles belonging to 
identified suspects, convicted individuals, victims, voluntaries and other 
persons of interest to the criminal investigation. Nearly 69 countries are 
currently using forensic genetic databases, and there are estimates that this 
type of database is beginning to be implemented in about 34 other coun-
tries (Interpol, 2016). The fifth chapter of this book will present the dif-
ferent implications of the creation and development of forensic genetics 
databases, considering the necessary balance between curtailing civil rights 
and protecting society’s security.
Looking at forensic databases as a particularly ostentatious form of 
genetic surveillance of criminalized populations, we will discuss them 
within the scope of a society that is growingly focused on intensifying and 
accelerating the mass circulation and interlinking of data. In this context, 
the cultural and socio-economic phenomenon of big data is approached in 
this chapter as a part of a datafied society (Broeders & Dijstelbloem, 2016; 
French & Smith, 2016; Sadowski, 2019; Smith, 2016; van Dijck, 2014) 
where bio-surveillance technologies gain prominence. In other words, 
technologies based on processing information are linked to biological 
materials originating in the human body (Hindmarsh & Prainsack, 2010; 
Kloppenburg & van der Ploeg, 2018; Skinner, 2018b).
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are, therefore, continuously being expanded and developed, seeing as one 
of the facets of this expansion is also its growing interoperability. With the 
goal of strengthening police cooperation in the European Union, we have 
seen a rise in the number of international mechanisms for population sur-
veillance and control. The sixth chapter focuses on this theme, particularly 
the way the opening of the European Union’s borders was followed by a 
proliferation of control mechanisms for transnational criminality. Among 
them, we outline the Prüm System, which represents a network created 
between EU Member States to exchange data stored in the national data-
bases of various countries in the Union, with the goal of combating terror-
ism and cross-border criminality.
The implementation, development and expansion of the Prüm System 
have led to heated debates on issues of transparency, accountability and 
data privacy (McCartney, 2014; Prainsack & Toom, 2010; Toom, 2018; 
Toom, Granja, & Ludwig, 2019).
In a context marked by a datafied society, concepts such as ethnicity, 
race and national identity are recycled by the operators of forensic genetic 
databases as practical categories. These operational categories are mobi-
lized as organizing principles and consequently sustained by a kind of 
rationality that assumes these categories as acquired data (Fujimura & 
Rajagopalan, 2011). However, several authors (Cole, 2007; Duster, 2006; 
Risher, 2009) have warned about the fact that new surveillance technolo-
gies have, inversely, reinforced the legitimacy of old prejudice and even 
created new ways to stigmatize and exclude, from the moment the surveil-
lance technologies operate based on principles that separate suspect from 
non-suspect individuals (Van der Ploeg, 1999).
Following functional imperatives, a set of practices that would other-
wise elicit some ethical reservations due to the curtailing of civil rights are 
applied to criminal investigations. In particular, we outline the following 
technologies: familial searching, that is, the act of looking up profiles in 
forensic DNA databases that are genetically close to a known sample that 
was collected at the crime scene (García, Crespillo, & Yurrebaso, 2017; 
Granja & Machado, 2019; Haimes, 2006; Murphy, 2010) and intelligence- 
led DNA massive screenings, consisting in collecting a significant number 
of DNA profiles in a specific area where the suspect is thought to reside 
(Chapin, 2004; Duster, 2008). In addition, the inference of geographical 
ancestry, performed upon determination of the statistical distribution of 
the genetic profiles by zone and the subsequent proximity of the known 
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8sample to a probable area of origin is used in tandem with the inference of 
physical features through DNA. The joint use of these two technologies is 
commonly known as forensic DNA phenotyping (M’charek, 2008; 
Queirós, 2019; Samuel & Prainsack, 2018, 2019; Skinner, 2018a; Vailly, 
2017; Wienroth, 2018a, 2018b). The seventh chapter of this book will 
take a look at the use of these emerging DNA technologies and the nota-
ble scientific, ethical and legal controversies that have come to the fore.
Finally, the eighth and last chapter of the book will revisit, under a criti-
cal perspective, the multiplicity of roles and meanings of forensic genetics 
in the governance of crime in contemporary societies, while providing 
clues for future pathways for research in the field of social studies of foren-
sic genetics.
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CHAPTER 2
The Sociological Gaze
Abstract This chapter provides an explanation and context for situating 
the particular approach of sociology to the social phenomenon of the uses 
of forensic genetics in criminal justice systems. The aim is to describe, in 
an accessible manner, why the governance of crime using science and tech-
nology is a fertile domain for sociological enquiry and identify its distinc-
tive features. This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the main 
lines of enquiry and concepts of sociological paradigms, namely by focus-
ing on the continuum, tensions and translations between distinctive levels 
of analysis: micro-macro and objective-subjective. The presentation of the 
lines of social thought and concepts is accompanied by a brief reference to 
practical cases of empirical research related to the use of forensic genetics 
in the criminal justice system. The chapter will enable the reader to acquire 
theoretical and analytical skills which may be applied in academic research 
into the various topics and themes addressed in the book’s different 
chapters.
Keywords Sociological paradigms • Micro and macro • Objective and 
subjective • Consensus and conflict
14
Paradigms of sociological ThoughT
Sociology is a scientific discipline that presents different theoretical- 
analytical lines of thought to question society. Therefore, the sociological 
gaze upon forensic genetics and its role in the governance of crime is liable 
to adopt different ways to question our social reality. The main goal of this 
chapter is to systematize the main guiding lines of sociological theories 
and indicate how they may be applied to the study and analysis of forensic 
genetics in criminal justice systems.
According to George Ritzer’s point of view (1992), it is possible to 
distinguish three main paradigms in sociological thought: the paradigms 
of the social-facts, social-definition and social-behaviour. The last of these 
paradigms is linked to an analysis model close to experimental psychology, 
based on social behaviourism models. Considering that such paradigm has 
no representation in sociological approaches to forensic genetics, it will 
not be addressed in this work.
The social-facts paradigm focuses on what Émile Durkheim (1895 
[1964], 1897 [1951]) termed as social facts: values, cultural norms and 
social structures that transcend the individual and can exercise social con-
trol. Theorists who adhere to this paradigm study social structures and 
institutions on a large scale. In terms of favoured research methods, they 
tend to adopt structured interviews and questionnaires, as well as historical- 
comparative methods. The social-facts paradigm encompasses a number of 
theoretical perspectives. Different or even opposing sociological theories 
can be framed by this paradigm: both structural functionalism (usually asso-
ciated with the work of Talcott Parsons and his followers) and the so- called 
conflict theories (who were founded by Karl Marx). According to Ritzer, 
“Structural-functional theorists tend to see social facts as neatly interrelated 
and order as maintained by general consensus. Conflict Theorists tend to 
emphasize disorder among social facts as well as the notion that order is 
maintained by coercive forces in society” (Ritzer, 1992, p. 641).
Concrete examples are presented for the application of this paradigm 
when analysing the role of forensic genetics in the governance of crime: a 
functional perspective will tend to focus on the modes whereby socio- 
technical systems can foster cooperation, solidarity and harmony between 
social groups, as well on the forms whereby controversies can be solved 
and stabilized. Regarding the social expectations about the role of forensic 
genetics in the governance of crime, this perspective will be interested in 
studying the way police cooperation among countries can contribute to 
make society safer. On the contrary, the standpoint of conflict theories will 
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argue that technology should be regarded as the outcome of conflicting 
ideas and interests, being liable to reflect social relationships marked by 
domination by one of the parties and mirror social and economic inequali-
ties (Hard, 1993). This perspective will look at international security poli-
cies as a mechanism for social control that is able to boost geopolitical 
inequalities and reflects the interests of the most powerful social groups.
The social-definition paradigm follows an approach based on under-
standing and interpreting social action, and is inspired by the works of 
Max Weber (1949). This paradigm is focused on analysing the way that 
the social actors define their social relationships and their connected social 
contexts, as well as the effects of those definitions on the development of 
actions and interactions. In terms of methods, this paradigm privileges 
unstructured or semi-structured interviews, as well as the direct observa-
tion of social interactions. Several sociological theories can be included in 
this paradigm: action theory, symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, 
ethnomethodology and existentialism.
Many authors have defended that sociology must integrate the various 
paradigms and not establish hermetic, rigorous divisions between social 
structures and human agency. A multi-paradigm perspective will assume that 
the social world is constituted by multiple social phenomena, which require 
different levels of analysis but are mutually dependent. However, it is useful 
taking into consideration various paradigms and conceptual schemes that 
help identify and understand the complexities of the social world (Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Paradigms of sociological thought
Paradigm
Social facts Social definition
Main authors Émile Durkheim Max Weber
Basic concepts Social structure Human agency
Object of the 
study
Values, cultural norms and 
social structures
Social relationships and interactions
Methods Structured interviews
Questionnaires
Historical-comparative methods
Unstructured interviews
Semi-structured interviews
Direct observation of social interaction
Sociological 
theories
Structural functionalism
Conflict theories
Action theory
Symbolic interactionism Phenomenology
Ethnomethodology
Existentialism
Source: Table drafted by the authors
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social sTudies of forensic geneTics
Inauguration of the Field of Study
Several studies undertaken in the field of social studies for forensic genet-
ics come close to the Social-Definition Paradigm, inasmuch as a consider-
able part of the research performed is interested in perceptions, expectations 
and representations that the social actors confer to forensic genetics tech-
nologies. A paradigmatic example of this type of research based on under-
standing and interpreting social situations can be seen in the works of 
sociologist Michael Lynch, who was fundamental in the inauguration and 
development of the field of social studies in forensic genetics. This author 
made use of ethnomethodology, a method of sociological analysis that 
examines how individuals use everyday conversation to construct a 
common- sense view of the world (Lynch, 1993).
In this regard, we should highlight the study developed by Michael 
Lynch and a team of sociologists and other social scientists, with the sup-
port of the National Science Foundation and the Department of Science 
and Technology at Cornell University. The authors developed a multi- 
location study that involved the UK and the US while covering a period of 
15 years. This period ranges from the moment DNA technologies began 
to be actively discussed in courts and scientific journals (the late 80s) until 
the time such technologies were established as the “gold standard” 
(Lynch, Cole, McNally, & Jordan, 2008, p. xiii). This far-reaching work 
made use of document analysis, conduction of interviews with scientists 
and professionals working for the criminal justice system and observation 
of scientific laboratories and criminal trials.
With the goal of studying the intersection between science and law, the 
credibility of expert testimony, and historical comparisons between DNA 
evidence and other criminal identification tools, this team developed work 
that, although focusing on a “micro” dimension of reality—the percep-
tions attributed to DNA technology—sought to conjugate it with a 
“macro” analysis that made it possible to frame and give historic and social 
meaning to the materials being collected and analysed. The study’s results 
showed very clearly this duality. In order to explain how forensic DNA 
evidence increasingly gained an exceptional factual status in courts of law, 
Lynch and his colleagues showed that the objectivity and infallibility 
attributed to DNA evidence is the result of practical, day-to-day actions, a 
phenomenon named “administrative objectivity”. This administrative 
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objectivity of DNA evidence rests upon observable and reportable bureau-
cratic rules, records, recording devices, protocols and architectural 
arrangements (Lynch, 2013; Lynch et al., 2008). Beyond those points, 
the team also showed how the controversies around DNA profiling tech-
nologies reflect different professional interests and mirror socio-political 
and structural aspects linked to the criminal justice system of the US 
(Daemmrich, 1998; Jasanoff, 1995)
Despite its ethnographic character, this study is a paradigmatic example 
of the potential of integrating various sociological paradigms. This collec-
tive work originated the pivotal publications “Truth machine: The con-
tentious history of DNA fingerprinting” (Lynch et  al., 2008). Other 
results of this study were published in 1998, on a special issue of the jour-
nal Social Studies of Science, which continues to be one of the most presti-
gious publications in the field of social sciences focusing on science and 
technology. This special issue analysed the presence of forensic genetics in 
courts, and among other aspects tried to understand the implications of 
two different ways of acting and thinking coming together: the world of 
science and the world of law.
One of the study cases undertaken by Michael Lynch’s team, addressed 
in this special issue of the journal Social Studies of Science, was the criminal 
trial of O.J. Simpson, an American actor and former football player. In 
1994, O.J. Simpson was accused of murdering his ex-wife Nicole Brown 
and her friend Ronald Goldman. DNA evidence was presented during the 
criminal trial: both the defence and the prosecution called specialists to 
court who had published about DNA profiling techniques, which led to a 
heated debate on the controversies brought to the fore by this scientific 
technique. The case opened a complex field of questioning with several 
sociological ramifications, namely in terms of issues linked to the interpre-
tation of DNA evidence, public versus expert understanding of science, 
adequate and inadequate practices, as well as the relationship between the 
credibility of the DNA evidence and the larger infrastructure that supports 
the activities of both police forces and scientists (Lynch & Jasanoff, 1998).
Relationship Between the Macro and Micro Level
Most classic sociological theories study the new social structures that have 
emerged during modernity, which made it possible for scientific knowl-
edge to penetrate and transform social relationships. Several of these 
structures frame scientific development and have allowed its expansion 
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and legitimacy, supporting the social, historic and economic process that 
transformed science into one of the most important modern institutions. 
For example, classical authors analysed bureaucracy (Max Weber), capital-
ism (Karl Marx) or organic solidarity (Émile Durkheim). Various authors 
have debated the existing tension between macro and micro levels, trying 
to understand the connections between both levels of analysis, while giv-
ing birth to a fruitful and extended debate about the tension and ways to 
articulate human agency and social structure (Bourdieu, 1977; Giddens, 
1979, 1984).
Such an analysis about the macro and micro levels is also fundamental 
to understand how knowledge prerogatives regarding DNA technologies 
translate, on the one hand, the meaning, intention and interpretation 
given by one or more social actors and, on the other hand, the broader 
social structures and contexts. A close analysis of the creation and develop-
ment of those interactions and social structures is helpful to understand 
how a single act to vindicate the plausibility of a technology that extracts 
DNA profiles from biological samples (“discovered” by one individual or 
particular groups, in a specific point in time and space) has become part of 
a broader social structure. How did that knowledge—“scientific break-
through”—stabilize? Which new relationships and social structures were 
formed and consolidated by articulating macro and micro levels?
In the late eighties and early nineties, when DNA profiling technolo-
gies began to be used as auxiliary tools in criminal identification, there 
were not any protocols nor rules regarding the interpretation of the infor-
mation obtained from genetic profiles. Likewise, there was not a consen-
sus in the scientific community about how to perform DNA analyses and 
interpret the results (Aronson, 2008; Derksen, 2010; Lynch, 1998). 
Nowadays, things are different: there are protocols, quality patterns for 
laboratories and legal frameworks. That is to say, a broad and stable net-
work of social structures was created to frame and sustain the production 
and dissemination of knowledge about forensic genetics and its general-
ized acceptance in the criminal justice system (Hindmarsh & Prainsack, 
2010; Lynch et  al., 2008; Williams & Johnson, 2008). The scientific 
knowledge that led to the discovery of DNA technologies was, therefore, 
expanded from its local production context and integrated into the social 
order of various institutions, consequently stepping up from the micro- 
interaction level to the social structure’s macro level (Daemmrich, 1998; 
Derksen, 2003). In other words, we could say that the consensus around 
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DNA technologies represents the outcomes of successful knowledge- 
making activities (Derksen, 2010; Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Shapin, 1986).
When analysing the relationships between the micro and macro levels 
of social reality, we will consider the research undertaken by the sociolo-
gist Linda Derksen, who studied the development of DNA profiling tech-
nologies and their application in the justice system of the US (Derksen, 
2000, 2003, 2010). The author resorted to two theoretical sociology 
guiding lines: sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and the sociological 
theories which articulate macro and micro levels. Her approach uses 
examples from the history of DNA profiling to show specific, particular 
moments where the micro (for instance, consensus between two people 
about the validity of a DNA profile interpretation method) and macro 
(e.g., creating legislation for databases with thousands of genetic profiles) 
levels were translated into one another. Therefore, the author studied 
examples from the history of DNA profiling which show specific moments 
of translation where new knowledge is produced at micro level and is then 
taken up—entrenched—into new social structures at macro level (see also 
Aronson, 2008). In concrete terms, Linda Derksen argues that the stabi-
lization and standardization process of scientific knowledge generated 
around DNA profiling technologies led to the creation of new and diverse 
social structures. These social structures are what Anthony Giddens defines 
as rules and regulations and institutionalized patterns of behaviour 
(Giddens, 1984).
By applying the notion of social structure to DNA profiling technolo-
gies, we may refer to the stabilization of practices and protocols, the for-
mation of expert communities and their professional associations, the 
creation of standards for laboratory practices and quality monitoring, as 
well as to the construction of databases, political projects and legislation. 
It should be noted that one social structure encapsulates formal and infor-
mal dimensions of social relations, knowledge and tacit rules, as well as 
legislation and regulations, without forgetting material resources and 
advisory and governing bodies. At a more macro level, we can even men-
tion a type of society and culture that has made it possible to develop and 
expand DNA profiling databases and put them in the service of a criminal 
justice system: in this case, we are discussing a capitalist society and a 
Western culture.
For example, a concrete example of the creation of new and diverse 
social structures in forensic genetics is linked to the case of England and 
Wales, who created, in 1995, the first forensic DNA database: the National 
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DNA Database (NDNAD). Because of its significant expansion, from an 
early stage, NDNAD began to deal with the societal effects triggered by 
various ethical controversies concerning the massive social implications 
linked to its size and scope (Human Genetics Commission, 2009; Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, 2007; Skinner, 2013). These experiences have stim-
ulated the development of stricter regulation to protect citizens’ rights 
and, by extension, have also motivated the creation of particular social 
structures. Nowadays, the system of oversight of the NDNAD is formed 
by a partnership of boards and appointed experts, including (but not 
restricted to): the National DNA Database Strategy Board that provides 
governance and oversight over the operation of the National DNA 
Database and the National Fingerprint Database; The UK National DNA 
Database Ethics Group that provides independent advice on ethical issues; 
The Biometrics Commissioner whose role is to keep under review the 
retention and use by the police of DNA samples, DNA profiles and finger-
prints; and The Forensic Science Regulator that ensures that the provision 
of forensic science services across the criminal justice system is subject to 
appropriate scientific quality standards.
Continuum Between Subjective and Objective
Another level of sociological analysis is linked to the relationship between 
“subjective” and “objective”. While the subjective field is in the sphere of 
ideas, the objective one refers to real, material events (Ritzer, 1992, 
p. 643). Every society has an objective dimension—for example, laws and 
bureaucracy—and a subjective dimension—norms and values.
The continuum between subjective and objective is important to 
understand another crucial element of DNA technologies: the analysis of 
a genetic sample and the interpretation of the genetic profile extracted 
from that sample involve an act of translation and materialization into 
quantifiable values. The act of deciding if a specific genetic profile matches 
another genetic profile involves an assessment and also entails communi-
cating and revealing publicly to other laboratories a quantity called the 
standard error of measurement. The existence of protocols for the 
 interpretation of genetic analyses and the quantification of the standard 
error of measurement turn subjective assessments and evaluative state-
ments invisible, thereby producing a kind of knowledge considered as 
“objective” (Derksen, 2000). As the science historian Theodor Porter 
indicates, quantification is one of the most important tasks in scientific 
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practice because it transforms a knowledge claim from one which origi-
nates in a specific place and time to one which seems as if it could come 
from anywhere (Porter, 1995).
Quantification makes it possible to translate results into numbers, 
“erasing” the makes of human work (subjective) from the creation of sci-
entific knowledge (which is supposed to be objective). In Western cul-
tures, quantification is one of the most important processes to create what 
we call objective knowledge and “facts”. In the words of Linda Derksen, 
“successful quantification hides the representing subject, it hides subjec-
tive judgments and it renders judgment invisible” (Derksen, 2010, 
p. 223). This creation process of “objective” knowledge through proto-
cols, standards and turning certain classifications invisible (Bowker & Star, 
1999) made it possible for DNA profiling technologies to be seen as 
increasingly credible and reliable.
Laboratory studies,1 which were quite popular at the start of the 90s, 
showed, through ethnographic observation, how scientists generate 
among themselves interactive processes that make it possible to reach a 
consensus, in order to agree upon what a good match is or is not. In other 
words, accurate measurements are contingent, local achievements 
(Derksen, 2000; Kruse, 2016; Lynch et  al., 2008). Some authors have 
noted the existence of cooperation activities, aiming to reach consensus, 
so a standard can be expanded and used by heterogeneous communities, 
as well as used in different activities and places (Bowker & Star, 1999)—an 
approach that is close to the functionalist perspective.
On the contrary, other authors have emphasized activities of differen-
tiation and conflict, which leads to specific professional groups being able 
to impose their interests while driving away those of others. One example 
of this approach, as connected to the abovementioned conflicts theories, is 
the study undertaken by Jay Aronson on the role of the FBI in standard-
izing the techniques for forensic DNA profiling. According to the author, 
this standardization was the result of FBI practices with the goal of becom-
ing the dominant agents in the market of supply of forensic genetics analy-
sis services. To be successful, the FBI agents created a technological 
1 Laboratory studies represent the study of science and technology through direct observa-
tion and discourse analysis at the root where knowledge is produced and constituted as such. 
This approach is very emblematic of the way the micro and macro dimensions intersect. On 
the one hand, laboratory social studies are focused on practices and interactions in a specific 
location (the scientific laboratory), while on the other hand, they highlight the construction 
and consolidation of power relations in modern societies (Knorr-Cetina, 1995).
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infrastructure and a laboratory network that imposed their approach to 
the activities already being developed by private companies. At the same 
time, the FBI recruited prestigious forensic scientists to validate and lend 
credibility to the products and methods being developed by them 
(Aronson, 2008). This kind of approach allows us to understand how the 
stabilization of networks and structures for some actors may lead to the 
exclusion of others—a kind of perspective that emphasizes power inequali-
ties within forensic genetics (Quinlan, 2014).
After “stabilizing” the credibility of DNA profiling technologies, it was 
possible to store the DNA profiles in vast computer databases and dissemi-
nate them among the different social actors in the justice system, locally, 
nationally and internationally. Nowadays, DNA profiles can be shared and 
compared between different laboratories, provided that they use the same 
computer system and have adopted the same protocols (Aronson, 2007, 
2008; Machado & Granja, 2018; Santos, 2017).
The possibility of DNA profiles being “portable” was made attainable 
due to the creation of protocols and standards. Subsequently, this led to 
the expansion and consolidation of the use of forensic genetics in the crim-
inal justice system, including a reinforcement of the cooperation mecha-
nisms between police forces of different countries—a theme which will be 
addressed on Chap. 7 of this book. When knowledge is transformed into 
a quantitative format, it is easier for that knowledge to “travel” outside the 
place where it was produced and being appropriated or used by other 
social actors (Machado & Granja, 2018)—in other words, through quan-
tification, forensic geneticists can assume that the knowledge produced in 
a specific location follows “universal” guidelines that can be replicated by 
different people in different locations and reach the same results, thereby 
obtaining a kind of “local universality” (Timmermans & Berg, 1997).
Consolidation of the Social Studies in Forensic Genetics
The continuum between subjective and objective is very complex and 
intersects with macro and micro levels of social reality. The various works 
undertaken within the social studies of forensic genetics, consolidating it 
as an autonomous field of study, have shown exactly that relationship, 
which is also perceived and captured through different methodological 
strategies. In this last section, we will do a brief review of the empirical 
studies connected to the use of forensic genetics in the criminal jus-
tice system.
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Focusing on the specific case of England and Wales, Robin Williams 
and Paul Johnson (Williams & Johnson, 2004, 2008) explored the opera-
tional, legal and political aspects that have been brought to the fore while 
establishing and expanding the use of DNA technologies and the 
NDNAD. Taking into consideration the way different knowledges, prac-
tices and routines jointly constituted the NDNAD, the authors have anal-
ysed the perspectives of different specialist areas. Coupled with 
documentary analysis, they conducted 60 semi-structured interviews fea-
turing a range of individuals from organizations directly involved in either 
making use of or commenting upon the use of DNA profiling in the crimi-
nal justice system—the police, forensic scientists, crime scene examiners, 
legal professionals, legislators and those concerned with human 
rights issues.
The analysis undertaken by the authors shows how different represen-
tations of the potential and actual application of DNA are employed to 
support alternative ethical assertions about the forensic uses of DNA tech-
nologies and DNA databases. The authors differentiate three representa-
tions about the perceived “essence” of DNA and its applications in terms 
of criminal investigation. Firstly, “genetic exceptionalism” which stresses 
the unique character of genetic material, a perspective generally supported 
by members of ethics committees and human rights groups. Secondly, 
“genomic minimalism” which emphasizes the mundane character of 
forensic uses of non-coding sequences of DNA, more frequently adopted 
by civil servants working in the criminal justice system. Lastly, “biometric 
pragmatism” which distinguishes between different sources of DNA mate-
rial and what may legitimately be done with DNA obtained from these 
sources. This position is usually mobilized by criminal investigators and 
prosecutors and by some academic forensic experts (Williams & Johnson, 
2004, p.  211). Based on their extensive work, the authors, therefore, 
articulated the perceptions, intentions and interpretations conferred by 
social actors to DNA to the broader social structures and contexts, namely 
their professional occupation and respective epistemic cultures (Knorr- 
Cetina, 1999).
Another example of the articulation between the macro and micro lev-
els is the study by the sociologist Christopher Lawless (2011). In the after-
math of the closure of the Forensic Science Service (FSS), the leading 
provider of scientific support to police investigations in the UK, Lawless 
explored the impact of neoliberal policies in the evolution of the relation-
ship between science and the criminal justice system. The study was based 
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on documentary analysis, semi-structured interviews and a focus group 
with professionals from a commercial forensic science provider. Based on 
a micro-level analysis, Lawless explored the ways through which neoliber-
alism—by privatizing services—reformulated the epistemic possibilities for 
scientists and police professionals. He also showed how that reformulation 
coexisted with situated practices of resistance to attempts of moulding sci-
ence into commercial types of knowledge in service of law enforcement. 
Therefore, Lawless work shows how large-scale phenomena, like the capi-
talist system and neoliberal policies, directly intertwine with interactions 
on a micro scale.
Continuing to dwell on the studies that have sought to understand the 
different perspectives by professionals working on forensic genetics, some 
authors have also used ethnography to capture and analyse the way some 
professionals act and assign meaning to their practices. In this regard, we 
highlight the work of the anthropologist Corinna Kruse, who accompa-
nied the daily procedures of the Swedish National Laboratory of Forensic 
Science, observing day-to-day operations of a public prosecutor office, a 
criminal investigation division and a crime scene division, as well as observ-
ing trials. This way, Kruse was able to analyse the various instances that 
constitute DNA’s chain of custody. Based upon a research performed on a 
micro level, that paid attention to the practices and perceptions of social 
actors, the author showed how the social life of forensic evidence takes 
into account how knowledge is produced by and transported across a 
cooperation of an array of epistemic cultures (Kruse, 2016, p. 148).
Generally speaking, the studies referred so far highlight how research-
ers have “followed”, according to the Actor-Network Theory (Latour, 
2005) traditions, how social actors with various levels of authority, credi-
bility and power act and leave visible traces of their actions, such as proto-
cols, reports, forensic samples and forensic technologies. However, there 
are other marginal actors, “the one who both belongs and does not 
belong” (Quinlan, 2014) which also take part in the use of forensic genet-
ics in the governance of crime. One example of these actors are, for 
instance, the prisoners whose biological samples are collected. On this 
level, we should refer to the comparative study between Austria and 
Portugal developed by Helena Machado and Barbara Prainsack. Based on 
interviews with prisoners, the authors sought to understand the point of 
view of this group about criminal investigation practices based on DNA 
technologies. This study brought to light the ambivalent perspectives that 
prisoners have in relation to DNA technologies. On the one hand, they 
 H. MACHADO AND R. GRANJA
25
find it an important tool to identify and convict offenders or to acquit and 
exonerate suspects. On the other hand, they show doubts and uncertainty 
about the potential abuses they may fall victim to, and about the supposed 
deterrent effect of DNA technologies in crime prevention (Machado & 
Prainsack, 2012).
Continuing in the field of public perception, other authors have also 
expanded the literature on the social studies of forensic genetics, by con-
ducting studies focused on public perceptions about DNA databases, 
whether through qualitative methodologies (Anderson, Stackhouse, Shaw, 
& Iredale, 2010; Machado & Prainsack, 2012; Stackhouse, Anderson, 
Shaw, & Iredale, 2010; Wilson-Kovacs, Wyatt, & Hauskeller, 2012) or 
quantitative ones (an extensive review of the existing studies can be found 
at Machado & Silva, 2019). In this regard, we underscore the work of the 
sociologist Dana Wilson-Kovacs and colleagues (Wilson-Kovacs et  al., 
2012). By analysing the results of “The Mass Observation Project” which, 
since 1981, has collected and analysed detailed answers to questions about 
specific themes in order to gather information about the lives of normal 
people, this study shows how DNA profiling is seen by the participants as 
one of the less problematic applications of genetics.
As a whole, these studies reveal how social representations that the 
social actors may harbour towards forensic genetics (subjective dimension) 
may vary according to objective dimensions, namely the socio-economic 
condition, profession, gender, race or ethnicity. For example, the study by 
Machado and Prainsack (2012) notes how prisoners consider that having 
their genetic profile on a forensic DNA database managed by the police 
may reinforce the stigmatization towards individuals who have committed 
crimes (Machado & Prainsack, 2012). Other studies have also revealed 
that individuals from disadvantaged social groups and racial and ethnic 
minorities present a high degree of mistrust about the use of genetic evi-
dence in the criminal justice system (Curtis, 2009; Duster, 2006; Machado 
& Silva, 2019).
concluding remarks
A sociological approach to the use of forensic genetics in the governance 
of crime makes it necessary to consider the multiple social actors who 
interact among themselves, as well as the organizational context where 
they develop their activities. Developing a sociological study about foren-
sic genetics in the criminal justice system also entails considering macro 
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and micro, objective and subjective dimensions that frame and provide 
context to the interactions and representations of individuals and groups.
Let us begin by considering in detail the multiple social actors involved 
in the social processes linked to the use of forensic genetics in the criminal 
justice system. In terms of forensic genetics, we have a significantly hetero-
geneous community: from the laboratory technicians who receive the bio-
logical samples collected at the crime scene and dedicate themselves to 
analysing the materials to scientists who undertake research in the field of 
genetics, focusing their actions on innovations within the scope of genetic 
analysis techniques, without dealing directly with real cases. There are also 
those scientists who are directly involved with criminal cases, while not 
necessarily developing research in the field of forensic genetics: they gen-
erally have roles such as directors of forensic genetics laboratories, being 
responsible for the scientific validity of the analysis methods applied (Cole, 
2013). Lastly, in several countries, the criminal investigation police forces 
integrate groups of forensic experts—or police officers with specific train-
ing—who visit the crime scenes to select and collect the traces which will 
subsequently be forwarded for laboratory analysis (Costa, 2017; Kruse, 
2016; Santos, 2014). In terms of the criminal justice system, there is an 
even greater differentiation and diversity of social actors involved, who 
have diversified types of expert knowledge and professional cultures. They 
act in different areas: from police forces to court professionals, and the 
latter group includes judges, prosecutors, attorneys and juries.
The use of forensic genetics in the governance of crime also involves 
other social actors, whose scope of action has diverse social, political and 
cultural implications: for instance, the companies which supply equip-
ment, instruments and other materials to laboratories, without forgetting 
that some of them provide forensic genetics analysis for courts of law 
(Lawless, 2011; Wienroth, 2018). Another type of social actors are the 
groups who deal with ethical and legal issues linked to the use of forensic 
genetics for criminal identification, namely through their role as entities 
who supervise and monitor the activities of databases which contain 
 thousands of genetic profiles of citizens (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 
2007). Finally, there are also professional organizations in the field of 
forensic genetics, whose actions have international implications in terms of 
standardization and harmonization of procedures (e.g., in laboratories, 
law- enforcement or judicially): the politicians who decide the legal and 
regulatory framework which governs the application of genetic informa-
tion in criminal identification; the non-governmental organizations who 
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function as critical, vigilant voices regarding the risks of curtailing human 
rights as a result of the massive expansion of forensic DNA databases; 
people whose genetic profile is included in such databases (Machado & 
Prainsack, 2012), as well as other citizens (Anderson et  al., 2010; 
Stackhouse et al., 2010; Wilson-Kovacs et al., 2012).
Lastly, there is another group that is also part of this diverse set of social 
actors involved in the social processes linked to the application of forensic 
genetics in the criminal justice system, a group which is often disregarded 
by social studies of forensic genetics: the survivors and victims of crime. 
According to Andrea Quinlan (2014), this group of social actors, who she 
names marginal actors, “sits simultaneously inside and outside of the legal 
system’s institutional network […] ‘inside’ in the sense that their body 
serves as the” crime scene “from which DNA evidence is gathered […] 
‘outside’ as they are excluded from many of the practices within the legal 
system” (Quinlan, 2014). Paying attention to this set of actors would 
make it possible to create a “network from below” following the tradition 
of the Actor-Network Theory (Latour, 2005).
The heterogeneous nature of the social actors who are potentially 
involved in the social phenomenon of application of genetic technologies 
to the criminal justice system corresponds to different kinds of actions, 
knowledge, experiences and perspectives on society. Therefore, various 
sociologically pertinent issues may serve as the basis for studies in the 
field. The different chapters of this book have the goal of showing the 
various themes and issues that can be studied through a sociological 
point of view.
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CHAPTER 3
Biological Explanations of Criminal 
Behaviour
Abstract This chapter provides a historical and sociological overview of 
the biological explanations for violent and criminal behaviour. It starts 
with a detailed description of the seminal work by Cesare Lombroso 
(nineteenth century) and highlights the risks of biological determinism 
and the potential stigmatization raised by this line of research. It then 
discusses current trends of biologization and genetization of crime, by 
focusing on the specific studies in the fields of epigenetics and 
neurobiology.
The chapter aims to provide the reader with a critical reading of such 
trends through the lens of sociology. Specifically, it is outlined how previ-
ous and current biological and biosocial explanations of criminal behav-
iour can foster risks such as exclusion, marginalization and stigmatization 
and support notions of citizenship that differentiate between citizens who 
should be protected and those who should be monitored.
Keywords Biological determinism • Biogenetics • Epigenetics • 
Neurobiology • Stigmatization • Nature • Nurture
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Biological Determinism: the Work of cesare 
lomBroso
Cesare Lombroso (1835–1909), the psychiatrist who was the father of 
criminal anthropology, marked indelibly the history and trajectory of bio-
logical explanations for criminal behaviour. Two distinctive features typify 
Lombroso’s positivist approach: the first one is linked to a commitment 
towards collecting data through empirical observation. The collection of 
body measurements, such as weight, height and relative proportion of 
several body parts, was aimed at producing knowledge based upon alleged 
numerical objectivity (Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013, p. 170). The second 
distinctive feature of Lombroso’s approach is connected to the premise 
that propensity for crime is inscribed in individual biology (Walklate, 
2007). According to the author’s approach, this means that propensity for 
crime can be identified through “visible marks of criminality” that materi-
alize in physical, moral, degenerative and unalterable features (Cole, 2001; 
Horn, 2003; Rose, 2000).
In the publications L’Uomo Delinquente (1876, “The Criminal Man”) 
and Le Crime, causes et remèdes (1899, “Crime, Its Causes and Remedies”), 
which are based on studies influenced by Darwin’s natural selection theo-
ries, Lombroso defends that “criminals” are characterized by biological 
inferiority and possess “atavistic” physical and psychological traits that 
show physical and psychological “atavism” of a hereditary nature. Such 
traits are considered as being reminiscent of the earlier stages of human 
evolution (Dunnage, 2018; Newburn, 2007; Twine, 2002; Walklate, 
2007). Based upon such principles, the author outlines the features of an 
“ideal-type” of “born criminal”, that is, someone biologically predisposed 
for criminal activities. Among the physical traits listed by Lombroso we 
can find the “abnormal” shape or size of the skullcap and face, thick eye-
brows, prominent molars, big, deformed ears, bodily dissymmetry and 
large size of arms, hands and feet. In terms of behaviour and personality 
traits, Lombroso argues that these individuals are characterized by reduced 
sensibility to pain, cruelty, recklessness, aversion to work, instability, van-
ity, penchant for superstition and sexual precociousness. This way, 
Lombroso sketches a general portrait for criminals anchored in implicit 
and explicit assumptions about biological traits that are conceived as being 
independent of specific historical, social or political context (Klein, 2013, 
p. 195; Smart, 1995).
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The scientific and political implications of this approach were extensive 
in their impact and reach. According to the postulates of criminal positiv-
ism, if an individual’s criminal behaviour can be determined by innate 
individual traits, the goal of the justice system must be the incapacitation 
and treatment of these individuals until they are no longer a threat to soci-
ety (Walklate, 2007). This type of logic framed the eugenic strategies that 
proliferated in the US and Europe towards the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury and beginning of the twentieth century (Aungles, 1990; Duster, 
2003; Rose, 2000), involving initiatives such as permanent segregation, 
marriage restrictions, restrictive immigration policies and compulsory ster-
ilization (Newburn, 2007).
Eugenic strategies formed a movement with multiple modalities and a 
very questionable history, partly due to the association with the eugenic 
philosophies adopted by the Nazis in 1930 (Newburn, 2007). Following 
that kind of repercussion, biological theories about criminal behaviour 
received harsh criticism and became controversial, which pushed them to 
the outskirts of the scientific community and consigned them, for many 
years, to become synonym with scientific obscurantism (Machado, 2015).
Biogenetic explanations of criminal Behaviour
Notwithstanding the numerous controversies that have dogged the postu-
lates of biological determinism, since the 1980s there has been a growing 
trend to reinvigorate and legitimize studies that put biology and genetics 
at the forefront (Baker, Tuvblad, & Raine, 2010; Mednick, Moffitt, & 
Stack, 1987; Walsh & Beaver, 2009). Trying to move away from the per-
nicious implications of approaches based upon the biological determinism 
defended by Lombroso and some of his successors, the reinvigoration of 
biogenetic explanations for criminal behaviour is sustained by features that 
differ from the perspectives that precede them. A few guiding principles 
stand out in this regard. The first one refers to a focus on violent behav-
iour and criminal practices, considered by the scientific community as the 
most “likely” to be influenced by biological factors. Within this context, 
the potential usefulness of investigating epidemiological strategies in terms 
of public health was defended (Akers & Lanier, 2009; Lanier, 2010), in 
particular those aiming to calculate the risk of being biologically predis-
posed for criminality (Raine, 2013).
Therefore, the locus where the interest resides moves from looking for 
the criminal or aggressive genes towards identifying, intervening, taking 
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precautions and preventing risks, in order to identify vulnerabilities liable 
to increase an individual’s propensity for violent conduct (Rose & Abi- 
Rached, 2013). As shown by Nikolas Rose and Joelle Abi-Rached, this 
kind of approach is perfectly in line with our current socio-political junc-
ture, where crimes are not just seen as infractions but also as public safety 
problems, generating economic burdens. In the author’s words:
Within these control strategies of precaution, prevention and pre-emption, 
the question shifts from that of response to the offense after the act, to pro-
grammes of prediction and prevention that identify those at risk of the basis 
of a kind of algorithm that combines genetic and neurobiological factors 
with those relating to family life, parental behaviour, poverty, housing and 
other environmental factors. For these violent or impulsive behaviours at least, 
crime, is reframed as a problem of public health. (Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013, 
p. 190) [added italics]
The reinvigoration of biogenetic explanations for criminal behaviour is 
closely linked to the emergence and consolidation of genetics and neuro-
science. These new sciences, imbued with significant symbolic power, are 
able to lend scientific relevance to the studies aiming to turn human biol-
ogy into a readable entity (Pavlich, 2009; Rose, 2000; Twine, 2002; 
Walby & Carrier, 2010). There has been, however, an important shift: in 
the nineteenth century, the focus resided at the molar body, which was 
visible, tangible and easily revealed to the gaze of the experts. Nowadays, 
however, the focus on the body has been supplemented by the molecular 
level. A multitude of increasingly sophisticated biometric technologies and 
visualization devices nowadays renders the interior of the organic body 
readable while simultaneously allowing to decompose, anatomize, manip-
ulate and amplify it at the molecular level (Rose, 2001, 2007). One exam-
ple of a biometric technology that aims to render criminal bodies as 
readable is forensic DNA phenotyping that will be addressed in Chap. 7 of 
this book.
The proliferation of new technologies aimed at reading the body thus 
consolidates a new ontology of bodily datafication (French & Smith, 
2016; Hindmarsh & Prainsack, 2010; Kloppenburg & van der Ploeg, 
2018; Smith, 2016). This specific ontology is based on the notion that the 
reading of the body may provide an objective and indisputable source of 
truth about a person’s identity (Aas, 2006; Kloppenburg & van der 
Ploeg, 2018).
 H. MACHADO AND R. GRANJA
37
Finally, another guiding principle of this reinvigorated wave of studies 
that interlinks biology and criminality is its inscription into perspectives 
which conjugate genetic elements with social environments and the indi-
vidual’s psychological traits (Walsh & Beaver, 2009)—a theme to be 
addressed in detail in the next section of this chapter.
nature (versus) nurture
Epigenetics is one of the recent trends which most clearly illustrates the 
articulation between biogenetic and social aspects. In brief, epigenetics is 
a new post-genomic field of research, which has been growing and devel-
oping at an accelerated rate. It studies the molecular mechanisms regulat-
ing the roles of genes without altering the DNA sequence. The main 
principles underlying this field of research convey the idea that epigenetic 
mechanisms are: (1) sensible to environmental factors and lifestyles—in 
other words, instead of being determined exclusively endogenously, bio-
logical systems have enough flexibility to react to environmental changes 
(Loi, Del Savio, & Stupka, 2013, p. 143); (2) established at an early devel-
opment stage, with effects that can manifest themselves on a lifelong basis; 
(3) potentially transferable to subsequent generations (Hedlund, 2012; 
Loi et al., 2013); (4) possibly reversible through pharmacological and/or 
behavioural interventions (Tremblay & Szyf, 2010).
Although most investigations in the field of epigenetics are based upon 
incipient scientific discoveries, performed on animals and under experi-
mental conditions, there is a significant eagerness to extrapolate the pre-
liminary results to human behaviour (Richardson, 2015). Both the 
scientific community and popular culture have shown a marked interest in 
the potential uses of this field of post-genomic research in terms of public 
health (Meloni & Testa, 2014).
Nevertheless, attitudes and reactions regarding the potential held by 
epigenetics are subdivided. On the one hand, some researchers consider 
epigenetics as a new way of thinking that recognizes the importance of 
social aspects. On the other hand, others have remained sceptical on 
whether this new approach entails less biocentrism or if it is a cloaked way 
to reproduce “simple” biological explanations for complex social issues 
(Lloyd & Müller, 2018, pp. 675–676). Within the scope of this second 
position, some authors have alerted to the fact that epigenetic approaches 
may come to constitute new types of biological determinism (Richardson, 
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2015). As outlined by Stephanie Lloyd and Ruth Müller, “environmental 
epigenetics might also engender novel forms of biological essentialism, 
particularly if epigenetic modifications are framed as permanent bodily 
marks that determine the potentials of individuals and groups who have 
been exposed to potentially ‘harmful’ environments” (Lloyd & Müller, 
2018, p. 676).
The study of criminal behaviour is one of the fields where the contribu-
tions of epigenetics have been more readily “absorbed”. Richard 
E. Tremblay is one of the most influential authors in this field, a psychol-
ogy professor at the University College Dublin who was labelled as “the 
accidental epigeneticist” by Nature (Hall, 2013). After developing, over 
the course of several years, longitudinal studies with pre-school children 
evidencing aggressive behaviour and coming to the conclusion that dis-
ruptive behaviours are more significant in the earliest infancy stages, 
Richard Tremblay began working with Moshe Szyf, a geneticist and pro-
fessor of pharmacology and therapeutics at McGill University. Together, 
the two academics created an approach that explores the development of 
chronic aggressive behaviours through epigenetics (Tremblay & 
Szyf, 2010).
In brief, Tremblay and Szyf defend that epigenetic marks, modulated 
by the environment and by how children are nurtured by their mothers 
during the prenatal period and immediately following the birth, are fun-
damental to define the level of predisposition towards aggressive behav-
iour. The moment of conception and even that of preconception are, 
therefore, focal points of interest, where mothers are considered as the 
fundamental agents who will determine children’s future behaviours. 
Among the risk factors specifically connected to mothers, the two authors 
listed the following: pregnancy at a young age, history of behavioural 
issues, reduced educational resources, consumption habits of tobacco, 
alcohol and other substances, mental health issues, problematic intimate 
relationships, poverty and coercive motherhood (Tremblay, 2010; 
Tremblay & Szyf, 2010).
Tremblay and Szyf defend the creation and implementation of strate-
gies for precocious and intergenerational prevention with women. The 
defence of this highly controversial point of view is based, according to the 
authors, on presupposing that women who possess a few, or all, of these 
risk factors will be more prone to have children who will subsequently 
develop aggressive behaviours. Thus, according to the authors, society 
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must invest in intensive perinatal interventions to apply preventive and 
corrective measures to women of specific groups. According to 
Richard Tremblay:
The evidence suggests that preventing the development of serious disruptive 
behaviour problems should start at conception, at the latest, and needs to 
target females who have a history of social adjustment problems. In essence 
we need to turn on its head our thinking about prevention of disruptive 
behaviour: males are much more affected, but females should be our prime 
target to prevent a new generation of males and females with disruptive behav-
iour. (Tremblay, 2010) [added italics]
Construing the mothers’ bodies as “epigenetic vectors” will lead to 
strategies liable to increase the already high levels of control applied to the 
female body (Richardson, 2015). Moreover, as evidenced by the quote 
above, the category “women” does not simply emerge monolithically 
from the epigenetic approach: this perspective is focused on women from 
disadvantaged social backgrounds, which intersecting with class, race, age 
and ethnicity, face specific patterns of oppression and discrimination 
(Andersen & Collins, 2004; Burgess-Proctor, 2006; Weber, 2001). This 
shows the discriminatory and invasive potential of these approaches among 
more vulnerable social groups, as they expand, in terms of impact and 
reach, the type of social control applied to the reproductive female body 
(Richardson, 2015; Richardson et al., 2014).
However, this kind of reconfiguration of collective and individual 
responsibility is not restricted to recent epigenetic approaches (Meloni & 
Testa, 2014; Pickersgill, Niewöhner, Müller, Martin, & Cunningham- 
Burley, 2013; Richardson, 2015). By analysing the trajectory of neurosci-
ence when trying to explain criminal behaviours, Nikolas Rose and Joelle 
Abi-Rached (2013) show why there is a growing tendency to defend the 
connection between child deprivation, cerebral development and future 
behavioural problems, particularly if we follow the assumption that a 
child’s brain is malleable, and therefore very influenced by the objective 
conditions of his life. Some authors have argued that children who suf-
fered from neglect during their infancy are more prone to develop antiso-
cial behaviours in later stages of their lives (Perry, 2002, 2009). As noted 
by Rose and Abi-Rached, over time and through different sources of legit-
imacy, the family is indicated as the epicentre for the development of crim-
inal behaviour:
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We find the repeated arguments that one should minimize the host of social 
ills, including criminal and antisocial conduct, by governing the child 
through its family. […] Social justice, it seems, lies not in tackling the causes 
of structural inequality, poverty, poor housing, unemployment, and the like, 
but in managing parents in the name of the formation of good citizens. 
(Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013, p. 196)
This type of approach, which puts the family as the cornerstone to 
explain criminal behaviour, configures new models for biocitizenship. On 
the one hand, as they allow the body of certain individuals to be con-
strued as a menace to public health and safety. On the other hand, by 
underlining the potentially hereditary of predisposition towards aggres-
sive and criminal behaviour, these approaches also construe entire families 
as potential threats. Underlying to this line of action is the emergence of 
the concept of “anti citizen”, in other words, individuals categorized as 
biologically predisposed to risks, and towards whom it is justifiable to 
apply a set of control and monitoring activities and policies, even if they 
do not present any evidence of deviant or criminal behaviour (Rose, 
2000, p. 17).
concluDing remarks
Despite being consigned to obscurity and considered as “bad science” for 
many years, the reinvigoration of biogenetic approaches to criminal behav-
iour is presently an unavoidable milestone in the current framework of the 
governance of crime. Such a tendency is symptomatic of the genetization, 
molecularization and biologization of our contemporary society.
Within the scope of current studies, which are increasingly focused on 
body datafication ontologies, we seem to be witnessing a blurring of the 
boundaries between nature and nurture. Notwithstanding, we can also see 
how the symbolic power of genetics and technology have the potential to 
configure new kinds of biological determinism that may expand and 
increase, both in their impact and reach, the marginalization of certain 
social groups. Such groups are outlined according to social categories of 
gender, race and class, which are then confronted with biogenetic 
approaches that differentiate between law-abiding citizens, who should be 
protected, and anti-citizens, immediately monitored and controlled since 
they are in their mother’s womb.
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CHAPTER 4
DNA Technologies in Criminal Investigation 
and Courts
Abstract DNA profiling has been assuming a prominent role in the activi-
ties of the criminal justice system. Genetic technologies support criminal 
investigations, while also being seen as holding a highly valuable potential 
for producing evidence to be used in courts. This chapter has two main 
objectives: on the one hand, to describe and explain the ways that DNA 
technologies can be used in criminal investigation and turned into DNA 
evidence in criminal proceedings; on the other hand, this chapter aims to 
systematize the main lines of academic literature within the social sciences 
which have been developed to study the social implications and transfor-
mations of cultures and professional practices arising from the presence of 
DNA technology in the criminal justice system. Besides, the chapter also 
pays particular attention to the social nature of the high expectations asso-
ciated to the “infallibility” of DNA technologies and how the media por-
trays the use of forensic genetics and further exacerbates such notions.
Keywords Chain of custody • Criminal investigation • Courts • 
Infallibility myth • CSI effect
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DNA TechNologies AND iTs ApplicATioN iN crimiNAl 
iNvesTigATioN
There is now a broad consensus that DNA technologies play a vital role in 
justice systems in various regions of the world (Hindmarsh & Prainsack, 
2010; Kruse, 2016; Lawless, 2016; Lynch, Cole, McNally, & Jordan, 
2008; Toom, 2018; Williams & Johnson, 2008). DNA technologies sup-
port the collection of information that helps the criminal investigation, 
and DNA evidence is considered to have great value for judicial procedures.
However, the aura of infallibility associated with DNA technologies 
generates expectations which are often exaggerated and dissociated from 
the concrete reality of criminal investigation. It is therefore essential to 
recognize and identify the potential risks arising from the use of DNA 
technology, in order to prevent possible errors and threats to civil rights—
including upholding the presumption of innocence, genetic privacy and 
the moral and physical integrity of suspects or persons accused of crimes 
(McCartney, 2006; Murphy, 2007; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2007).
Identification of individuals using DNA profiles is often described as 
the most important discovery in the world of forensic science since the 
fingerprint (Lynch et al., 2008) and has even been designated by several 
authors as the most significant mean of human identification of the mod-
ern era. Development of studies on the use of DNA for individual identi-
fication depends upon broad zones that exist between the genes that are 
generally called “non-coding DNA”. These intergenic zones reveal spe-
cific chemical sequences that are supposed to be unique to each individual 
and therefore produce a “genetic fingerprint”. Comparison of different 
“genetic fingerprints” enables us to observe whether different samples of 
DNA come from the same individual or different individuals. There is also 
a biological relationship of descendance between the suppliers of different 
samples that might be compared. In short, each person’s DNA is unique, 
except in the case of identical twins.
A new epistemology of forensic identification (Cole, 2009) claims that 
it is impossible to achieve “perfect” individualization, and therefore, we 
should speak about probabilities rather than certainties (Kaye, 2009; Saks 
& Koehler, 2008). Scientific authorities generally argue that absolute indi-
vidualization is a theoretical goal, but even excluding identical twins, the 
inclusion of more markers in a DNA profile analysis leads to an increased 
likelihood of observation of somatic mutations, that is, intra-individual 
heterogeneity (Amorim, 2002).
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Forensic DNA analysis usually involves comparisons between genetic 
profiles extracted from biological samples collected from a specific site, 
object or person which is thought to be associated to a crime, in order to 
determine the likelihood that such samples come from a particular person 
(e.g., from a suspect, or victim, of a specific crime). Biological substances 
collected at crime scenes—such as blood, hair, semen, urine, skin, saliva, 
sweat and tears—all contain DNA. A DNA sample can also be obtained 
through a mouth smear from an identified person, or by collecting hair 
samples (including hair roots, since they contain the cells needed for anal-
ysis), blood samples (usually achieved nowadays by pricking the finger) or 
by scraping part of the body to remove a small sample of a person’s skin.
A molecular biological technique, called polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR) is fundamental for analysing DNA polymorphisms. This technique 
makes it possible to replicate in vitro and amplify and analyse trace amounts 
of DNA. Nowadays, this technique is frequently used in the preparation of 
DNA profiles for criminal identification and makes it possible to pair sus-
pects with blood, hair, saliva or sperm samples. DNA profiles are also often 
used for forensic civilian identification purposes, in particular for paternity 
testing and identification of missing persons and human remains (Bier, 
2018; Smith, 2017; Toom, 2017).
A technical problem raised by DNA profiles is the fact that contamina-
tion with DNA from an outside source can occur, both at the time of col-
lection and in the scientific laboratory. Contamination of the DNA sample 
is frequent in crime scenes, in old and degraded samples, in corpses and 
human remains. False identifications are likely to happen when used in 
partial profiles due to insufficient quantity or degradation of DNA 
(Murphy, 2007).
In addition to the aforementioned risks, there are ethical issues that 
derive from the type of information that can be obtained from DNA anal-
ysis. While traditional fingerprints only reveal a person’s identity, samples 
used for DNA profiles may reveal much more information, namely about 
the individual’s kinship ties, which may be unknown to the individual 
(Haimes, 2006; Kim, Mammo, Siegel, & Katsanis, 2011). With advances 
in the knowledge of the human genome, even the so-called non-coding 
DNA may in the future be associated with sensitive information, such as 
diseases and behavioural traits (Duster, 2003; Williams & Johnson, 2004a).
The myth of the infallibility of genetic identification can condition the 
conduct of the police investigation itself and the assessment of evidence in 
court. Hence, it is desirable to question the reliability and scope of the 
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DNA evidence and the consideration of the circumstances associated with 
each case. It is, therefore, necessary to guarantee the principle of taking 
precautions when using DNA profiling as a means of evidence, since in 
certain circumstances it may become controversial and maybe a source of 
abuse and judicial errors (Gill, 2014, 2016; Schiffer & Champod, 2008).
From The crime sceNe To The lAborATory 
AND The courT
The presence of DNA technology in the criminal justice system involves 
multiple professionals and differentiated spaces. Within the framework of 
the so-called chain of custody, the focus is on the crime scene and its 
observation to identify and collect biological traces that may subsequently 
be useful for identifying a perpetrator. Subsequently, the biological traces 
are analysed in a laboratory context. Finally, scientific reports on the DNA 
analysis are presented to the persons responsible for judging the 
case in court.
Social science studies have revealed that, in an initial stage, various con-
troversies arose, associated to doubts about the credibility and robustness 
of DNA technology that accompanied the start of its practical applications 
in human identification (Aronson, 2007; Jasanoff, 1995; Lynch & 
Jasanoff, 1998). However, DNA testing gained a more respected status 
due to its unparalleled capacity to identify criminal suspects (Lynch et al., 
2008; Williams & Johnson, 2008). As Michael Lynch argues, DNA test-
ing is treated “as both the source and object of an extraordinary and even 
absolute, degree of certainty in criminal law” (Lynch, 2013, p. 60).
Claims for the operational utility and scientific standing of forensic 
DNA profiling are often made in the context of new concepts and meth-
ods designed to improve the quality and effectiveness of police criminal 
investigation practices (Williams & Johnson, 2008). Therefore, forensic 
DNA evidence is often viewed as capable of enhancing police practices 
with some degree of “objectivity” associated with the scientific authority 
of DNA technologies (Cole & Lynch, 2006; Costa, 2017; Santos, 2014). 
However, studies with police forces reveal that police professionals con-
sider that DNA testing is subject to various contingencies, which is why it 
should be seen primarily as a source of intelligence, to be taken into 
account in criminal investigation in conjunction with other types of leads 
and evidence (Huey, 2010; Machado & Granja, 2019).
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In short, as the anthropologist Corinna Kruse (2016) points out in her 
study about the Swedish justice system, the views and uses of DNA evi-
dence tend to vary. The different professionals who are involved in inves-
tigating crimes and taking decisions on whether suspects should be 
accused or exonerated, construct different meanings and interpretations 
regarding the value of forensic genetics. The author illustrates the multi-
plicity of meanings attributed to DNA testing by different professionals, 
as follows:
To a crime scene technician, forensic evidence is something that can be pro-
duced by traces (…) from a crime scene. To a police investigator, forensic 
evidence is something that may be able to help him or her to assess a per-
son’s narrative. To a forensic scientist, forensic evidence is a trace that is to 
be analysed and evaluated (…) To a prosecutor, forensic evidence is some-
thing that will help him or her to convince the court of a defendant’s culpa-
bility. And to a judge, forensic evidence is something reliable, an anchoring 
point in their assessment of a case. (Kruse, 2016, pp. 155–156)
Rather than serving as a machine for generating truth, DNA evidence 
relates to the expectations, epistemic cultures (Knorr-Cetina, 1999) and 
objectives of each social and professional group. There is no uniform and 
absolute perception of what DNA technologies can achieve in terms of 
criminal investigation: the expectations of a criminal investigator are dis-
tinct from the convictions of a scientist or from that which is expected 
from judges, lawyers, jurors or even from convicts. The presence of DNA 
technology also brings different traditions, cultures, languages and proce-
dures into interaction: it immediately places into dialogue—and tension—
science and law (Edmond, 2001; Jasanoff, 2006). While science aims to 
convey “neutral” and “objective” knowledge, the intrinsic mission of the 
legal system is to try to establish the “truth of facts” based on scientific 
evidence and decide on the guilt or innocence of a person accused of com-
mitting a crime. In short, a DNA profile is subject to a transformative and 
contingent process that involves several actors, practices and organiza-
tional structures. To achieve the status as credible and robust, DNA evi-
dence is subject to a series of events that highlight technical-scientific, 
legal and bureaucratic procedures, which sociologist Michael Lynch and 
his colleagues (Lynch et  al., 2008) have termed “administrative 
objectivity”.
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The csi eFFecT AND The AssociATeD risks
Criminal investigation using the potential of forensic genetics has attracted 
media attention, fuelling a phenomenon that many people call the “CSI 
effect”. Television representations of criminal investigation focus on tech-
nology: the true heroes of police series are no longer detectives but instead 
forensic identification technologies (Kruse, 2010; Machado & Prainsack, 
2012). DNA evidence assumes a particularly important role in this regard 
since it symbolizes an ideology in which machines are more reliable and 
“safer” than human action and knowledge.
Although there is no consensus as to whether or not there is a “CSI 
effect”, and the exact nature of this phenomenon (see Ley, Jankowski, & 
Brewer, 2010), it is generally associated with the idea that judges and 
juries allegedly attribute more weight to evidence obtained through the 
application of molecular genetic techniques than to other types of evi-
dence. Police stories inspired by DNA technology use cultural images that 
reflect a dominant idea, which is taken as being accurate and absolute, in 
relation to the work of researchers and the decisive power of forensic iden-
tification techniques—in particular, the perception that DNA evidence 
offers “infallible evidence”. This set of ideas is propagated not only by 
television crime drama that focuses on the use of forensic science but also 
by journalists, lawyers and other actors in the justice system, such as 
judges, public prosecutors and eventually the police officers themselves.
Academic studies of how the media portray the uses of forensic investi-
gation technologies in criminal investigations, and the effects that this 
coverage may have on different audiences, have increased in recent years. 
These studies focus especially in the adversarial judicial system, in which 
jurors and barristers take centre stage: juries (citizens) can decide whether 
or not the accused (defendants) are guilty, and it is up to the representa-
tives of the parties involved to argue about the validity and meaning of the 
evidence admitted to trial. The judge often plays the role of a “passive 
arbitrator”, responsible for defining the rules of the trial and whether or 
not the presented evidence may be admitted.
Existing literature on the alleged CSI effect has mainly discussed the 
way that television series shape audience perceptions of DNA technology, 
routine crime scene analysis procedures and the steps used to identify 
criminal offenders, given that audiences are generally distant from the 
“real world” of criminal investigation and court work. The main focus of 
these studies has been on the influence of series such as CSI on the 
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 respective viewers (Brewer & Ley, 2010; Schweitzer & Saks, 2007), on 
jurors—ordinary citizens summoned by courts to evaluate criminal cases 
that may be complex and may involve DNA evidence—and also on judges 
and police investigators themselves (Cole & Dioso-Villa, 2007; Durnal, 
2010; Huey, 2010; Shelton, Kim, & Barak, 2006).
There is also a study group focusing on how a specific social group, 
individuals serving prison sentences, views media messages about DNA 
technology. According to existing studies (Machado & Prainsack, 2012; 
Machado, Santos, & Silva, 2011; Prainsack & Kitzberger, 2009), prison-
ers tend to believe that DNA evidence has almost absolute power in terms 
of identification, based on the idea that the genetic profile is a technology 
with a probative and criminal identification capability which is far superior 
to fingerprints. However, the infallibility of DNA technology is not con-
sidered to be absolute by these inmates: they accentuate the possibility of 
human error and harbour strong suspicions of police officers or malicious 
individuals who may deliberately “plant” biological traces in crime scenes 
to incriminate them. They have also stated that they fear that the authori-
ties will lie about the existence of DNA evidence to obtain confessions 
from criminal suspects (Machado et al., 2011).
Another aspect to be noted concerning the consequences that the TV 
series has on the professionals of the justice system is the concern har-
boured by the community of forensic scientists in relation to the alleged 
lack of public literacy. The CSI effect, together with a lack of literacy on 
the probabilistic framework involved in the interpretation of DNA evi-
dence, is considered by many forensic geneticists to be the major obstacle 
in their task of communicating the results of DNA analysis to members of 
the criminal justice system (Amorim, 2012; Amorim et al., 2016). A recent 
study on the subject, based on the social representations of members of 
the forensic genetics community in Europe, highlights the scientists’ con-
cerns about how the professionals of the justice system and members of 
the public attribute an excessively “enthusiastic” and “optimistic” value in 
relation to DNA’s capacity as evidence in court cases (Amelung, Granja, & 
Machado, 2019). In response to these challenges, there are a few strate-
gies for addressing such risk communication. Some examples include pro-
viding concrete models for good practice for evaluative expert reporting 
and suggesting standards for evaluative reporting within professional net-
works, such as the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes 
(ENFSI) (Biedermann, Champod, & Willis, 2017).
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coNcluDiNg remArks
The risk associated with the use of DNA technologies in the criminal jus-
tice system most commonly identified in the literature, in the fields of 
forensic genetics and the social sciences, regards the myth of the infallibil-
ity of genetic identification. Academic research reveals how notions related 
to the alleged infallibility of DNA technologies can condition the conduct 
of the police investigation itself, and how evidence is appraised in court. 
To this effect, it is desirable to question the framework of DNA evidence 
and consider the circumstances of each specific case. One possible way is 
to consider that the DNA profile should only be used as a means of back-
ing up other types of evidence, and to safeguard the principle of equal 
access to evidence, defence and prosecution, as already occurs in most 
justice systems.
Another risk arising from the use of DNA technology, which should 
not be dissociated from the myth of its infallibility, concerns the risk of 
stigmatization arising from social inequalities, which are reproduced as 
soon as police forces decide to collect a biological sample of certain indi-
viduals to the detriment of others. The literature on sociology and crimi-
nology has systematically referred to the way that police practices primarily 
target individuals and communities who are considered to pose risks. This 
risk of suspicion is directed towards identification and subsequent collec-
tion of data (DNA profile and other biometric data) from the most 
deprived social groups and individuals belonging to so-called ethnic 
minorities (Chow-White & Duster, 2011; Cole & Lynch, 2006; Duster, 
2006; Skinner, 2013; Williams & Johnson, 2004b).
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CHAPTER 5
DNA Databases and Big Data
Abstract Criminal DNA databases are expanding in different regions of 
the world to support the activities of the criminal justice system. The use 
of techniques that combine different sources of digital information for 
preventing and anticipating the risk of crime (one of the potential uses of 
so-called Big Data) is increasingly seen as a promising strategy to govern 
crime. This chapter provides an overview of the development of techno-
logical systems orientated towards genetic surveillance of criminalized 
populations. It also outlines a comprehensive mapping of the main ethical, 
social and political challenges related to the growing uses of DNA data-
bases and Big Data at a global scale.
Keywords DNA databases • Big Data • Ethical challenges • Genetic 
surveillance
Data ColleCtion in the information SoCiety
Forensic genetics has become a significant resource for criminal investiga-
tion and evidence-gathering activities for court proceedings in judicial sys-
tems around the world (Hindmarsh & Prainsack, 2010). One of the most 
prominent aspects of the use of forensic genetics in the criminal justice 
system is the creation and expansion of centralized national databases that 
contain genetic profiles that are inserted and stored in function of criteria 
defined in the legislation of each country (Santos, Machado, & Silva, 
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2013). These databases may contain genetic profiles of convicted persons, 
suspects, victims, volunteers and other persons of interest, in order to con-
duct criminal investigations.
A database provides a matrix of genetic profiles based on biological 
samples collected from a set of individuals. In the context of a pending 
criminal investigation, traces found in the crime scene or on the victim’s 
body may be analysed and the resulting DNA profiles will be compared 
with those included in the genetic forensic database, thus making it pos-
sible to identify the origin of this vestige, in the event of a positive match.
The process of creating forensic databases with genetic profiles began 
in the mid-1990s. The first forensic genetic database was set up in England 
and Wales in 1995, and countries such as the Netherlands (1997), Austria 
(1997) and Germany (1998) followed suit. It is estimated that there are 
now 69 countries around the world operating this type of database and 
that at least 34 countries are starting the process of implementing their 
own database (Interpol, 2016; Prainsack & Aronson, 2015). Such data-
bases exist in different regions of the world, especially in Europe and 
North America: however, recent developments point to growing expan-
sion in Asia, in particular in China, India and South Korea (Forensic 
Genetics Policy Initiative, 2017).
The creation of databases to support criminal investigation is aligned 
with the social, economic and political context of the so-called informa-
tion society, which many authors consider to be a society of maximum 
surveillance that began to emerge in the mid-1980s (Boersma, Van Brakel, 
Fonio, & Wagenaar, 2014; Garland, 2001; Lyon, 1992, 2006; Marx, 
2002; Norris & Armstrong, 1999). The phenomenon of Big Data emerges 
in the context of technological development and the growing importance 
of the digital world, which is associated with large-scale collection of citi-
zens’ data. It can be defined as a technique that aggregates and analyses a 
massive amount of data, converting it into algorithms, numerically catego-
rized and identified by employing a calculated index, from which informa-
tion may be extracted. The technique can be applied in several spheres of 
social life, including commerce, consumption, health, social security, mar-
keting and immigration. In the context of this book, the authors will pay 
careful attention to expectations associated to the potential of applying 
Big Data in the fields of criminal investigation and security (Brayne, 2017; 
Chan & Moses, 2015, 2017; Tsianos & Kuster, 2016). The complexities 
and challenges arising from the use of forensic DNA databases and Big 
Data in the context of criminal investigation will be presented and briefly 
discussed in the different sections of this chapter.
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ethiCal QueStionS aSSoCiateD with the uSe 
of forenSiC Dna DatabaSeS
It is now widely recognized that forensic genetic databases can be benefi-
cial for criminal investigation activities and the production of evidence in 
the justice system and may eventually contribute to crime prevention and 
deterrence (Santos et  al., 2013; Walsh, Buckleton, Ribaux, Roux, & 
Raymond, 2008). However, the use of such databases raises diverse and 
complex ethical, social and political questions which, from our perspec-
tive, must be considered in the context of suitable involvement of various 
social actors: legislators, judicial operators, forensic experts, politicians 
(Machado & Silva, 2015a, 2015b; Wienroth, Morling, & Williams, 2014). 
Commentators from different professional fields and scientific disciplines 
have pointed out the need to consider that the use of forensic genetic 
databases should be conducted while considering ethical concerns and the 
need to respect fundamental human rights, such as freedom, autonomy, 
privacy, presumption of innocence and equality (Amankwaa & McCartney, 
2018; Krimsky & Simoncelli, 2011; Van Camp & Dierickx, 2007).
The most controversial ethical issues related to DNA databases for 
criminal investigation above all concern the criteria related to the selection 
of the DNA profiles to be included and to the collection, conservation, 
use and circulation of data. This question is highlighted by the clear trend 
towards the growing use of such databases. There are other aspects that 
may raise ethical issues, which will be listed below (Hindmarsh & Prainsack, 
2010; Prainsack & Aronson, 2015).
The myth of the infallibility of DNA profiling may lead to overlooking 
possible laboratory errors and other errors and result in the marginaliza-
tion or even elimination of other types of evidence in court. Identification 
errors can have profound and irremediable implications, so guaranteeing 
quality in all technical procedures is also an ethical issue.
There is the possibility of establishing kinship ties through familial 
searching (see Chap. 7), even though this information might even be 
unknown to the person who is registered or may constitute a breach of the 
individual’s private life and moral integrity.
Forensic DNA databases reproduce and reinforce social inequalities. 
Members of specific minorities are more likely to be included in forensic 
DNA databases and then, consequently, placed under greater surveillance 
(Chow-White & Duster, 2011; Skinner, 2012, 2013, 2018). The seminal 
work of Robin Williams and Paul Johnson (2004) is essential in this respect 
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for its analysis of the unique nature of the surveillance based on DNA data 
and its implications for the construction of suspicion. The authors argue 
that DNA databases allow for “reconstructive surveillance”, forming a cir-
cuit surveillance system which holds information that can be applied ret-
rospectively, meaning that people and their actions are not watched, but 
are inferentially reconstructed using expert practices (Williams & Johnson, 
2004, pp. 3–6). As the authors note, “DNA databases have a speed, effi-
ciency, automation, and accuracy that are unmatched in the history of 
policing” (Williams & Johnson, 2004, p.  8). Moreover, Williams and 
Johnson explain that DNA databases form “a type of surveillance which is 
essentially concerned with ‘management’ of those already deemed crimi-
nal […] delimiting them from the wider population and managing them 
through assured detection” (Williams & Johnson, 2004, p. 11).
Finally, it is important to note that there are high costs associated to 
creating and maintaining a DNA database, and there are no studies that 
provide consistent evidence of its efficacy, utility and deterrence effect 
(Toom, Granja, & Ludwig, 2019). Do the benefits of this technology 
justify this investment? In other words, can it be argued that these resources 
will be better applied in crime prevention policies, social reintegration of 
offenders and/or in ways to reinforce protection for the most vulnerable 
segments of society?
In 1997, Derick Beyleveld, a specialist in Law and Ethics, proposed the 
following systematization of what he called the enthusiastic model (“camp 
enthusiastic”) and the pessimistic model (“camp hostile”) concerning 
weighting the risks and benefits associated with the use of forensic DNA 
databases. This proposal of general models is a mere abstract construction, 
which selectively accentuates certain aspects of concrete reality 
(Beyleveld, 1997).
The enthusiastic model of the use of DNA databases within criminal 
justice appears to be based on a model of criminal justice that focuses on 
identifying and punishing offenders and deterring crime. It is accepted 
that, in principle, all individuals may be guilty, and that one of the pur-
poses of the justice system is to find out who actually committed crimes 
and then punish them. In relation to the normative question of the 
 relationship between the collective good and the individual good, this 
position is guided by affirmation of the relative superiority of the interests 
of the community, considering that upholding people’s safety and com-
batting crime are common goods that justify placing constraints on indi-
vidual rights. From this perspective, emphasis is placed on greater 
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effectiveness in identifying guilty persons and valuing a society with more 
effective structures in controlling individuals and ensuring safety 
(Beyleveld, 1997).
The pessimistic model emphasizes the potential risks and drawbacks of 
using DNA databases in the criminal justice system and understands that 
the primary purpose of the justice system is to uncover the truth and pro-
tect the rights of innocent people. It is accepted that, in principle, defen-
dants are presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. There should, 
therefore, be special attention placed on procedures that protect defen-
dants against the possibility of error and ensure equal access to evidence, 
both for defence and for prosecution. This position broadens the reflec-
tion on the possible harmful consequences for democracy that can be cre-
ated by a society that chooses people’s safety as a supreme good, though 
the extension of the criteria for inclusion of information in a DNA data-
base may prove to be inadequate and disproportionate to the potential 
benefits (Beyleveld, 1997).
It should be noted that it is difficult to find empirical evidence of an 
extreme position, either in legislative, political or expert terms or of what 
may be the simple assumptions of ordinary citizens (Machado & Silva, 
2015b; Williams & Johnson, 2004). It is easier to find compromises, 
which relate to the need to strike a balance between safeguarding people’s 
safety and combatting crime, while upholding citizens’ rights, freedoms 
and guarantees (Amankwaa, 2018; Wilson-Kovacs, 2014; Wilson-Kovacs, 
Wyatt, & Hauskeller, 2012). The search and justification of this desirable 
balance are, however, differentiated. The debate tends to lean towards one 
side and reflect different views on the following issues: what should be the 
main objectives and orientations of the criminal justice system, what 
should be the guiding ethical principles and what are the specific agendas 
and interests of different social, professional or political groups (Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, 2007).
the Panorama of forenSiC GenetiC DatabaSeS 
in euroPean CountrieS
The size of forensic genetic databases and their type of organization and 
regulation is highly varied. Legislation may state the possible purposes or 
uses of DNA databases, distinguishing between criminal identification, 
civil identification and scientific research purposes. It can also establish the 
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scope and means of access to the information held in the database; for 
example, whether all authorities (judicial authorities or police forces) have 
access or whether access is restricted to certain agents of the justice system. 
Or whether only information about matches between genetic profiles may 
be communicated or if other information can also be communicated (e.g., 
personal data relating to the person identified by means of the 
genetic profile).
Other issues that are usually determined in national legislation are those 
related to the criteria for insertion and removal of genetic profiles and 
biological samples. Different options exist in the legislation of different 
countries that determine the scope and extent of access to the DNA data-
base based on criteria such as the type of crime committed, the maximum 
duration of the potential sentence, the individual’s characteristics and the 
likelihood of recurrence. As a result, the law is expected to respond to the 
following questions: which individuals and under what circumstances shall 
profiles be inserted into the DNA database? What is the fate of biological 
samples collected from suspects or convicts? What are the deadlines for 
retention of DNA profiles and samples?
In general terms, the criteria governing the insertion and removal of 
profiles and samples constitute the variable that will have the most signifi-
cant impact on the size of databases of genetic profiles. According to Filipe 
Santos and colleagues, who carried out a study on legislative trends in 
DNA databases in Europe, there are countries with expansive legislation 
and others with restrictive legislation (Santos et al., 2013). According to 
this typology, the countries with restrictive legislation are Germany, 
Belgium, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden, whereas the countries with expansive 
legislation are Austria, Denmark, Scotland, Slovakia, Estonia, Finland, 
Latvia, Lithuania and the UK (England, Wales).
According to the authors, if a specific law has few constraints (e.g., the 
inclusion of the DNA profile of any individual suspected of any punishable 
offence) on the insertion of profiles into the DNA database for forensic 
purposes (whether a suspect or convicted person), the country may be 
designated as having an expansionist tendency with respect to the devel-
opment of such databases. By contrast, countries with a restrictive ten-
dency are those whose legislation currently contains various constraints 
that restrict and limit the uses of DNA databases—for example, the impo-
sition of limits on the types of sentences or crimes eligible for the insertion 
of profiles.
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It should be noted that the apparent dichotomy between the expan-
sionist and restrictive tendencies refers to the potential specific effects of 
legislative provisions. These effects are reflected, for example, in the pro-
portion of the national population present in the database of each country. 
Table 5.1 shows the size of several forensic genetic databases in Europe. It 
should be pointed out that although it presents a type of “restrictive” leg-
islation, there has been remarkable expansion over recent years, and it now 
occupies the third largest forensic genetic database in Europe. The data-
base of genetic profiles in England and Wales remains the largest of all, 
notwithstanding recent legislative changes in the wake of the decision of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) following S. & Marper v. 
UK1 (McCartney, Williams, & Wilson, 2010), which ordered the 
 destruction of biological samples and the elimination of DNA profiles of 
1 S & Marper v. UK refers to a complaint lodged with the European Court of Human 
Rights by two individuals (S, an 11-year-old child, and Marper) against the UK. Both S. and 
Marper were detained in unrelated circumstances in 2001, and their fingerprints and DNA 
samples were collected. No accusations resulted from the arrests, which led them to ask the 
Chief Constable to eliminate the records. The requests were denied. After appeals against the 
Chief Constable’s decision to the courts and the House of Lords, it was determined that 
although individuals had not been charged with any crime, and despite the possible breach 
of privacy, fingerprint retention and DNA profiling was considered to be beneficial to society 
(McCartney et al., 2010). The ECHR’s decision went the other way, and determined that 
the retention of fingerprints and DNA profiles of suspects who haven’t been convicted con-
stitutes a “disproportionate interference” with individuals’ rights to privacy and “cannot be 
taken for granted in a democratic society” (Council of Europe, 2008, par. 125).
Table 5.1 Size of several forensic genetic databases in Europe
Country Population Total no. of individuals 
inserted in the database
Proportion of population 
in the database
Germany 82,000,000 857,000 1.0%
Austria 8,100,000 203,054 2.5%
Denmark 5,500,000 116,433 2.1%
France 66,030,000 3,282,418 5.0%
Netherlands 17,000,000 237,254 1.4%
Scotland 5,500,000 311,107 5.7%
Hungary 9,982,000 148,384 1.5%
England and 
Wales
53,700,000 4,733,755 8.8%
Sweden 9,894,888 153,008 1.5%
Source: ENFSI (2016)
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acquitted suspects or persons who haven’t been accused of any crime 
(Amankwaa & McCartney, 2019).
Despite legislative differences in European DNA databases, the domi-
nant trend towards their generalization and more harmonized sharing of 
information has been increasingly encouraged, based on the common 
threat of cross-border crime and terrorism. After the implementation of 
the Prüm Decisions (EU Council, 2008a, 2008b), in particular the parts 
related to sharing of information from DNA databases may lead to the 
need for further legislative harmonization in the various EU countries—a 
topic that will be further explored in Chap. 6. Given the diversity of the 
criteria for insertion and removal of DNA profiles and preservation of 
samples, it is difficult to ensure compliance with the principles of equality, 
proportionality and presumption of innocence in the context of the trans-
fer of information about DNA profiles between the Member States. For 
example, the apparent insufficiency of a policy of standardization and 
monitoring of processes related to cooperation activities, and also the col-
lection, retention, processing, interpretation and legal application of infor-
mation on DNA profiles, within the framework of the planned measures 
(Amankwaa, 2019; McCartney, Wilson, & Williams, 2011; Santos & 
Machado, 2017; Toom, 2018).
biG Data in the Criminal inveStiGation
The topic of Big Data has gained increasing visibility in the public arena 
and academic studies. It is generally understood to be a phenomenon 
which, using digital technology, collects, stores and analyses data from 
various sources for certain specific purposes. A popularized assumption 
regarding Big Data is that its essence might be defined by using three 
“V’s”: volume, velocity and variety. Other characteristics can also be listed: 
Big Data refers to data sets with a high level of completeness (e.g.,  covering 
entire populations) that contain contextual information that can identify 
concrete and specific situations (e.g., instead of identifying groups or types 
of people, it makes it possible to identify specific persons). Also, such data 
sets are relational (i.e., they make it possible to compare data derived from 
different sources) and flexible (they can incorporate new data at any 
moment) (Chan & Moses, 2015; Kitchin, 2014a, 2014b).
From a sociological perspective it is crucial to address Big Data as a 
cultural, social and political phenomenon (Boyd & Crawford, 2012), 
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which encompasses the following dimensions, as defined by Janet Chan 
and Lyria Bennett Moses:
(1) Technology: maximizing computation power and algorithmic accuracy 
to gather, analyze, link and compare large data sets. (2) Analysis: drawing on 
large data sets to identify patterns in order to make economic, social, techni-
cal and legal claims. (3) Mythology: the widespread belief that large data sets 
offer a higher form of intelligence and knowledge that can generate insights 
that were previously impossible, with the aura of truth, objectivity and accu-
racy. (Chan & Moses, 2015, p. 24)
The “mythological” aspect associated with Big Data finds similarities in 
the social imaginaries associated to forensic genetics, and is also liable to 
generate expectations of producing irrefutable truths in the identification 
of perpetrators (Lynch, Cole, McNally, & Jordan, 2008). This type of 
social expectation concerning Big Data opens the doors to expansion and 
reinforcement of surveillance practices, which will henceforth take on spe-
cific new contours while reproducing “old” practices.
A central aspect of Big Data’s implications for criminal investigation 
concerns the predictive and anticipatory nature of risk. This aspect of Big 
Data reinforces a trend that is already seen in the creation and expansion 
of forensic genetic databases, as described in earlier sections of this chap-
ter. Big Data therefore emerges as a reinforcement of the trends towards 
foreseeing and anticipating risk: through massive quantification and new 
possibilities for rapid cross-checking of data from sources that until 
recently have been dispersed, such as the proliferation of automatic alert 
systems which, on an unprecedented scale, monitor people who have 
never had any contact with the criminal justice system (Brayne, 2017).
In the framework of criminal investigation, Big Data can, therefore, act 
as a means of generating intelligence for criminal investigation, making it 
possible to quantify assessment of risk and classify individuals according to 
their degree of risk. For example, Big Data techniques can serve to deter-
mine the risk that specific individuals will commit a crime or terrorist act 
(Ball, Di Domenico, & Nunan, 2016; Lyon, 2014). Quantification of the 
level of risk presented by certain individuals means that Big Data rein-
forces the surveillance of social groups and individuals who are more vul-
nerable to police suspicion, thereby consolidating social mechanisms of 
stigmatization and reproduction of social inequalities (Brayne, 2017; 
Kitchin, 2014b; Matzner, 2016; Raley, 2013).
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ConCluDinG remarkS
In the context of this chapter, DNA databases and Big Data techniques are 
both seen as processes through which new and effective social control 
modalities have been configured. Such processes are associated with politi-
cal and governmental strategies for crime prevention and control, in soci-
eties that are increasingly less tolerant of “suspicious” citizens and willing 
to adopt more intensive regimes of social control, regulation and inspec-
tion. The analysis in this chapter is underpinned by the understanding of 
the concept of surveillance as the streamlined control of information in 
modern organizations intertwined with capitalist production and con-
sumption systems and with the bureaucratic functioning of the State 
(Haggerty & Ericson, 2000; Lyon, 2004, 2014).
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CHAPTER 6
Forensic Genetics and Governance 
of Transnational Criminality
Abstract Contemporary societies are increasingly facilitating movement 
while simultaneously creating forms of restricting and monitoring the 
mobility of persons deemed problematic. This chapter focuses on the 
growing relevance of genetic technologies in this domain by discussing the 
several forms whereby genetics has been used to prevent, manage and 
survey transnational criminality. In order to shed light on the complexities 
associated with such a phenomenon, we provide the reader with an in- 
depth explanation of an empirical example: a pan-European network, 
called the Prüm system, created to exchange the data stored in the national 
DNA databases of different European Union (EU) countries in order to 
combat terrorism and cross-border criminality.
Keywords International mobility • Transnational criminality • 
Exchange of DNA data • Prüm system
The ConTrol of Irregular MobIlITy
The celebration and facilitation of the movement of people, goods and 
capital within the European Union (EU) coexists with attempts to moni-
tor, restrict or inhibit the mobility of individuals deemed problematic 
(Aas, 2013; Bigo, 2005; Pickering & Weber, 2006). Although Europe’s 
internal borders have been to a certain extent abolished, as pointed out by 
Dennis Broeders and Huub Dijstelbloem, “mobility is not for everyone: 
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there is a politics of mobility in which the differential distribution of 
mobility produces some of the starkest differences today” (Broeders & 
Dijstelbloem, 2016, p. 245). As a result, surveillance systems are increas-
ingly being deployed to work as instruments of social sorting (Lyon, 
2007), segregating between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” mobilities 
(Amoore, 2006). Respectively, one kind of mobility is associated with high 
economic, cultural and social capital, regarding individuals moving due to 
leisure and/or business; while another kind of mobility is associated with 
irregular immigration and/or criminal practices (Aas, 2011). It is thereby 
clear that tracing mobility is no longer solely focused on territorial bor-
ders. The management of borders has shifted and expanded to a focus on 
internationally mobile populations that are considered as suspect commu-
nities (Aas, 2011; Ajana, 2013; Bosworth & Guild, 2008; Broeders, 2007; 
Skinner, 2018; Tutton, Hauskeller, & Sturdy, 2014). Such suspect com-
munities are defined by the interlinking of nationality, race and (lack 
thereof of) social, cultural and economic power.
Transnational criminality tends to be approached as one of the most 
significant challenges posed by international mobility. As a result, at least 
in terms of public discourse, the prevention and investigation of cross- 
border crime have been the main driving force and justification for the 
proliferation of surveillance systems (Aas, 2011, p. 337). Nowadays, soci-
eties have been witnessing a swift development in the expansion of net-
works of surveillance systems and networked databases aimed at visualizing, 
registering, mapping, monitoring and profiling mobile populations 
defined in terms of risk (Broeders & Dijstelbloem, 2016). Within such 
context, biometric technologies have been increasingly deployed as the 
prime form to control and manage international mobility (Aas, 2011). 
Biometric technologies create an inseparability between corporal and digi-
tal elements in contemporary governance projects (M’charek, Schramm, 
& Skinner, 2014).
This chapter focuses on a EU system which clearly outlines the role of 
forensic genetics in the governance of crime: a pan-European network, 
called the Prüm system, created to exchange the data stored in the national 
databases of different EU countries in order to combat terrorism and 
cross-border criminality. Several policies aimed at crime control and migra-
tion directly or indirectly highlight and discriminate against minorities and 
populations or individuals originating from specific countries. Contrary to 
such a scenario, the Prüm system directly targets already criminalized pop-
ulations, since it networks different forensic DNA databases.
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baCkground and Rationale of The PrüM deCIsIons
In the aftermath of Schengen,1 which abolished border controls in a num-
ber of European countries, several EU Member States became increasingly 
concerned about transnational movements of people deemed risky and, 
consequently, about the growth of transnational crime (Broeders, 2007; 
Guild & Geyer, 2008; Hufnagel & McCartney, 2017). Although the 
informal exchange of DNA data has often taken place on an ad hoc basis 
(Hufnagel & McCartney, 2015; McCartney, Wilson, & Williams, 2011), 
it was no longer deemed as sufficient and, consequently, voices began to 
be heard calling for a closer cooperation among police forces (Luif, 2007).
Attempting to respond to such perceived need to expand the transna-
tional surveillance network and foster closer police cooperation, on May 
2005, in the small German town of Prüm, the government representatives 
from Austria, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Germany, the Netherlands 
and Spain signed a treaty that would become known as the Prüm 
Convention,2 which set provisions for exchanging data regarding DNA, 
fingerprints and motor vehicle information. The preamble of the 
Convention stated that, in the context of the free movement of persons, 
the EU Member States had to
[p]lay a pioneering role in establishing the highest possible standard of 
cooperation, especially by means of exchange of information, particularly in 
combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration, while leaving 
participation in such cooperation open to all other Member States in the 
European Union. (EU Council, 2005, p. 3)
The background leading to the Prüm Convention was an initiative by 
Otto Schily, the former Interior Minister of Germany who, in 2003, pro-
posed a closer cooperation in justice and internal affairs with France, 
Belgium and Luxembourg in a context where a Police Centre was opened 
in Luxembourg by the four countries. According to Paul Luif (2007), this 
1 The Schengen acquis, in 1995, pertains to the abolition of border controls of a number 
of European countries. Subsequently, the Treaty of Amsterdam, in 1997, has adopted the 
Schengen agreement into EU law.
2 In this chapter the authors use the term “Prüm Convention” to refer to the 2005 
Convention involving seven countries, the term “Prüm Decision” to refer to the Council 
Decision that established the mandatory nature of transnational data exchange for all EU 
Member States and the term “Prüm system” to refer to the actual network of European 
Union countries exchanging DNA data.
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initiative, which aimed to develop a closer cooperation between the police 
forces of Germany and its neighbours, was deemed necessary because of 
“transnational crime, which had increased after removing the Iron curtain 
at the end of the Cold War and which had been made easier by the ceasing 
of border controls between the participants of the Schengen area” (Luif, 
2007: 6; see also Bigo, 2004, 2008: 94; Bigo & Guild, 2005; Kuus, 2004; 
M’charek et al., 2014: 16).
In 2008, some of the Prüm Convention provisions were subsumed into 
the police and judicial cooperation provisions in European Union law by 
a Council Decision, commonly referred to as the Prüm Decisions (EU 
Council, 2008a, 2008b). These Prüm Decisions made it mandatory for all 
EU Member States to join the pan-European network for the exchange of 
fingerprints, DNA profiles and motor vehicle information. It was decided 
that data should remain the property of the Member State where it was 
collected, eliminating the need for a centralized database. Therefore, this 
meant that all EU Member States that had yet to establish databases for 
DNA profiles, fingerprints and vehicle data information were obliged to 
do so, in order to allow access to them to the relevant EU authorities. 
August 2011 was the deadline established for all EU countries to comply 
with the Prüm Decisions. However, most countries were unable to com-
ply with such a deadline due to several reasons (McCartney et al., 2011; 
Prainsack & Toom, 2013): (1) difficulties faced in the mobilization of 
political majorities to adapt national laws to Prüm provisions; (2) conflicts 
between stakeholders over who should take responsibilities for Prüm; (3) 
human and financial resources (Prainsack & Toom, 2013; Töpfer, 2011). 
Moreover, Italy, Greece, Ireland and Malta faced additional constraints as 
they did not have a DNA database or dedicated legislation when the Prüm 
Decisions were adopted (Toom, Granja, & Ludwig, 2019).
Currently, the latest report on the progress of the implementation of 
Prüm on DNA data, dating from September 2019, indicates that there are 
25 EU Member States in operational conditions (EU Council, 2019). The 
non-operational countries are Greece, Ireland and Italy. Being operational 
within Prüm’s transnational exchange of DNA data does not, however, 
immediately imply that all operational countries are connected. Available 
data also shows that the level of connection is very different: while the 
Netherlands and Austria are connected to 23 countries, Bulgaria is 
exchanging DNA data with 9 countries and the UK with 1 country (EU 
Council, 2019).
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PrüM Modus opeRandi
Transnational DNA data exchange within the Prüm system works as fol-
lows: when a search is made in a national database for a DNA sample 
retrieved from a crime scene and no match is found, the Council Decision 
permits the data to be transmitted and searched in the national databases 
of other Member States (the so-called Step 1 of the Prüm system). A noti-
fication is then sent to the original Member State notifying it of a hit or 
the lack thereof. If a hit is identified, further requests for information are 
processed through the existing police or judicial channels (the so-called 
Step 2 of the Prüm system, which is governed by national law).
The EU regulation of the Prüm system stipulates that, for the purposes 
of supplying data, each Member State shall designate a National Contact 
Point (NCP), and the powers of the NCPs shall be governed by the appli-
cable national law (Decision 2008/615/JHA). Different countries have 
attributed the custody of the national DNA databases to different entities, 
ranging from judicial authorities to police forces. In the great majority of 
countries involved in the Prüm system, the Ministry of the Interior (or 
Ministry of Internal Affairs or Ministry of Home Affairs)—a government 
ministry typically responsible for policing, emergency management, 
national security and immigration matters—has custody over the National 
Criminal DNA Database. The exceptions to this scenario are Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden, in which the Ministry of Justice has 
custody over the National DNA Database. The Ministry of Justice typi-
cally has specific duties associated with the organization of the justice sys-
tem, overseeing public prosecutors and maintaining the legal system and 
public order. As a result of such a diversified context, the roles and respon-
sibilities of Prüm NCPs may vary among countries, according to different 
organizational structures and national legislation.
The forensic practitioners acting as NCPs are central actors in the Prüm 
regime: they conduct the daily activities that enable transnational exchange 
and hold a crucial position in decision-making processes. In particular, the 
persons acting as NCPs must organize and implement the necessary pro-
cedures and connections to perform automated exchanges with other 
databases (both receiving and sending information), perform tests with 
partners in other countries as well as manage and report DNA matches. 
The NCPs in charge of complying with the technical standards for the 
exchange of DNA data information among Member States on a hit/no- 
hit basis are officially called Step 1 NCPs. Typically, these NCPs are 
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 forensic experts working in forensic genetics laboratories. The NCPs in 
charge of the requests for additional information through mutual assis-
tance procedures are called Step 2 NCPs and are usually professionals with 
relevant experience in police and judicial cooperation in transnational 
criminal investigations. Therefore, the Prüm regime brings together a 
wide range of professionals and a shifting set of relationships with data, 
technological infrastructures, operational procedures and criminal justice 
systems that support the circulation of information (M’charek, Hagendijk, 
& de Vries, 2013).
The PrüM Challenges
The development of the Prüm system has received academic attention that 
might be summarized along two distinct lines of enquiry: on the one 
hand, a branch of literature that focuses on Prüm’s societal, political and 
ethical challenges; on the other hand, a group of studies that aim to map 
the geographical patterns of cross-border crime and DNA data flows 
among the different EU Member States.
Within this first group of literature, it is clear that the ethical implica-
tions of the transnational exchange of forensic DNA data under the Prüm 
regime are paramount. The current academic debate highlights the ethical 
challenges related to data protection, the excessive surveillance of citizens 
and potential threats to civil rights such as privacy, liberty and the pre-
sumption of innocence (McCartney, 2010; McCartney et  al., 2011; 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2007). Additionally, several authors 
observed a democratic deficit when the Prüm Convention was transposed 
into EU acquis (Balzacq, 2005; Balzacq, Bigo, Carrera, & Guild, 2006; 
Bellanova, 2017; Bigo, 2008). Such issues are compounded by the lack of 
systems to ensure transparency, accountability and trust, as well as ethical 
oversight of the transnational flow of law enforcement information 
(Hufnagel & McCartney, 2015; McCartney, 2013, 2014a, 2014b; 
McCartney et al., 2011; Prainsack & Toom, 2010, 2013). Victor Toom 
and his colleagues, when reviewing a decade of cross-border exchange and 
comparison of forensic DNA data, outline how their concerns over 
accountability and transparency posed at the time of the Prüm Decisions 
(EU Council, 2008a, 2008b) continue to be problematic, as quantitative 
and publicly available information that would make it possible to access 
DNA data exchange and comparison in the Prüm regime is limited, dis-
jointed and largely unavailable (Toom, 2018; Toom et al., 2019).
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Another crucial topic of debate within regards the enormous disparities 
in national legislation across EU Member States. As previously noted in 
Chap. 5, in the EU, there is considerable variation among national foren-
sic DNA databases regarding the criteria for including profiles and the 
periods of time and conditions for their retention and/or deletion (Cho & 
Sankar, 2004; Machado & Silva, 2016; Santos, Machado, & Silva, 2013; 
Van Camp & Dierickx, 2007). Thereby, such a scenario draws attention to 
the inherent heterogeneities of the Prüm regime, by binding together 
diverse regulations regarding the collection and retention of forensic bio-
information (Prainsack & Toom, 2013).
Barbara Prainsack and Victor Toom (2010) explored the situated dis/
empowerment of the Prüm system on the basis of three dimensions: data 
protection, new investigative epistemology and increasing investment on 
DNA technologies. In terms of data protection, the authors show that 
while Prüm might render a wide group of people into objects of surveil-
lance, by working in a two-step approach, it might also reduce the amount 
of information that travels across borders. Such a decrease will, in princi-
ple, occur because personal data is only sent after a match has been con-
firmed, thus leading to a more targeted exchange. Prainsack and Toom 
(2010) also outline the forms whereby Prüm co-constructs a new investi-
gative epistemology. By constituting DNA evidence in criminal investiga-
tions as central, a new configuration emerges in ways that shift power away 
from criminal investigators and towards forensic geneticists. Finally, the 
authors also explore how Prüm might, indeed, contribute to solving 
crimes in the EU (thus empowering citizens and victims) yet it might also 
divert attention and resources from other types of crime not directly 
involving biological evidence, such as human trafficking, fiscal crimes and 
child abuse (Prainsack & Toom, 2010).
Some of these preliminary analyses have inspired recent empirically 
based studies on Prüm. One of such studies explores what “ethics” means 
to forensic practitioners actively involved in transnational DNA data 
exchanges under the Prüm system (Machado & Granja, 2018). Based on 
interviews with Prüm NCPs, the authors demonstrate that such profes-
sionals face a wide variety of ethically significant issues. Participants high-
lighted that ethics are related to good scientific and laboratory practices, 
mentioned problems when receiving contaminated samples in the labora-
tory or reporting false positives to other countries, referred to data protec-
tion procedures and outlined efforts to address social accountability by 
producing reports for assessment by external authorities and/or use by 
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the general public. Moreover, the authors found that NCPs created “ethi-
cal boundaries” between science/ethics, science/criminal justice systems 
and good/bad science that aimed to address and manage ethical 
controversies.
In another publication, Helena Machado and Rafaela Granja addressed 
the topic of how forensic DNA evidence is given meaning within the vari-
ous ways of constructing a police epistemic culture within Prüm (Machado 
& Granja, 2019a). Based on interviews with NCPs involved in interna-
tional police cooperation, the authors show how the construction of a 
particular police epistemic culture is related to dynamics linked to the 
boundary work that creates, advocates and reinforces distinctions regard-
ing other professionals also involved in transnational cooperation, such as 
the judicial authorities and forensic scientists. On the one hand, the judi-
cial authorities are seen as a professional group that works mainly through 
formal procedures on a national or local level, while lacking the experience 
of international cooperation traditions. On the other hand, police profes-
sionals enact boundary work in relation to forensic scientists by outlining 
how the value of a DNA hit does not reside in the hit by itself but on the 
police work which can turn DNA data into DNA evidence. Hence, the 
Prüm system involves the interaction of various epistemic cultures and 
professional practices, entailing both cooperation and coordination, in 
addition to enacting the differences and divisions between the different 
social actors in the criminal justice system (Machado & Granja, 2019a).
One other study by Helena Machado, Rafaela Granja and Nina Amelung 
analysed the fluid and flexible forms of constructing suspicion which take 
shape in transnational governance of crime through forensic DNA data-
bases (Machado, Granja, & Amelung, 2020). The authors demonstrate 
that, within the Prüm system, suspicion is constructed through forms of 
deterritorializing and reterritorializing assumptions about criminality 
linked to the movements of suspect communities across the EU.  The 
deterritorialization of suspicion is configured in two ways. Firstly, it ampli-
fies imaginaries of Europeanization that are linked to the increase in trans-
national collaboration in the area of crime control. Considering that the 
“free” mobility of citizens within the EU facilitates criminal activity across 
borders, NCPs conceive the emergence of the Prüm system as a logical 
outcome. The transnational exchange of DNA data is therefore seen as an 
opportunity to regain “control” over the coexisting mobility of non- 
criminal and criminal populations. Secondly, the deterritorialization of 
suspicion also involves incorporating depersonalization, neutrality and 
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procedural objectivity into the operations of the automated and perma-
nent DNA data exchange. Juxtaposed to that, the reterritorializing of sus-
picion operates through the continuous (re)creation of assertions 
concerning criminality and specific populations from certain East European 
countries. In this sense, the transnational exchange of DNA data in EU 
demonstrates how “new” forms of suspicion relate to the reinforcement of 
“old” criminal categories (Machado et al., 2020).
One last study conducted by Machado and Granja regards how NCPs 
perceive the risks and benefits of transnational exchange of forensic DNA 
data. The authors show that the perceived benefits relate to the intensifica-
tion of tools for combating transnational criminality, development of stan-
dardization and harmonization of forensic DNA testing procedures and 
reinforcement of professional cooperation. The perceived risks are associ-
ated to the possibility that individuals may be prosecuted on the basis of 
false positives, the lack of available data to measure the effectiveness of the 
Prüm system and the different modus operandi of police forces and judicial 
authorities (Machado & Granja, 2019b).
The second group of studies on the Prüm system have been assessing 
the geographical patterns of cross-border crimes solved by the exchange of 
DNA data among the different EU Member States (Bernasco, Lammers, 
& Van der Beek, 2016; Taverne & Broeders, 2015, 2016). One study sug-
gested a territorial divide between Western and Central European coun-
tries and Eastern European countries. On the basis of an analysis of the 
official statistical data et of the Prüm system, this research revealed a trend 
amongst Western and Central European countries to accumulate the 
majority of DNA profiles of individuals originating from Eastern European 
countries (Santos & Machado, 2017). In other words, the study showed 
how the geographical patterns of DNA flows between the EU Member 
States involved in the Prüm system appeared to confirm previous research 
about the patterns of criminal mobility affecting central European coun-
tries, which is mostly associated with volume crime usually involving indi-
viduals originating from Eastern Europe (Bernasco et  al., 2016; Siegel, 
2014; Van Daele, 2008).
ConCludIng reMarks
Taking into consideration the increasing shifts in several social life domains 
when collecting and processing massive amounts of data, this chapter 
articulates how, within contemporary projects that aim to know and 
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 govern mobile bodies (Aas, 2011; Broeders, 2007), the governance of 
crime takes place by managing several decisions related to the production, 
circulation and use of data. The transnational exchange of DNA data via 
the Prüm system represents a technological infrastructure designed to 
control transnational mobile populations through a dispersed network 
featuring an enhanced level of detection.
In addition to fostering a closer collaboration among police forces in 
the EU, the Prüm system also emerged as an additional driver of the pan- 
European integration project by attempting to overcome cultural, political 
and socioeconomic disparities. It did so through a combination of techno-
logical standardization measures among countries and an ongoing empha-
sis on a prevalent discourse focusing on security and risk prevention 
(Prainsack & Toom, 2013). Nevertheless, such a goal of overcoming dis-
parities is paired with the consolidation of a system of wider social sorting 
that highlights several geopolitical tensions. In other words, since national 
DNA databases tend to reflect policing practices that usually target minor-
ities, such as foreigners and/or ethnic minorities (Chow-White & Duster, 
2011; Duster, 2006; Skinner, 2013, 2018), by enabling the transnational 
exchange of data, the Prüm system has the power to reassert and extend 
the discriminatory power of DNA databases. The transnational exchange 
of DNA data in the EU thereby enables the (re)making of the connections 
between criminality and suspicious movements of data and of particular 
populations leaving specific national territories (Machado et al., 2020).
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CHAPTER 7
Emerging DNA Technologies 
and Stigmatization
Abstract Despite their consolidated role in providing evidence for crimi-
nal justice, DNA technologies have been subjected to continuous invest-
ment that has given rise to the emergence of new DNA technologies. This 
chapter will focus on such innovations, explaining how forensic genetics is 
increasingly expanding its role in the criminal justice system. Recent tech-
nologies such as familial searching and forensic DNA phenotyping might 
help to generate intelligence for criminal investigations. Familial searching 
is a technology that attempts to identify criminal suspects through their 
genetic connection with relatives. Forensic DNA phenotyping makes it 
possible to focus on a particular suspect group that shares genetic ancestry 
and/or externally visible characteristics. The chapter critically reviews the 
existing debate in the field of social sciences about emerging DNA tech-
nologies. The core argument is that the application of DNA phenotyping 
and familial searching in the governance of crime holds the potential to 
increase risks of stigmatization and reinforce the criminalization of certain 
populations who are more vulnerable to the actions of the criminal justice 
system.
Keywords Intelligence • Familial searching • Forensic DNA 
phenotyping • Stigmatization • Criminalization
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From EvidEncE Towards inTElligEncE
Since the establishment of the use of DNA technologies to support the 
activities in criminal justice systems worldwide, there has been an expan-
sion in the breadth and reach of the potential ways they can be used. The 
applications of DNA technologies in the field of criminal justice systems 
include expanding the collection, storage and use of DNA profiles in 
forensic DNA databases (as covered in Chap. 5), the development of the 
exchange of DNA data among different countries within the context of 
police and judicial cooperation (see Chap. 6) and the speculative genera-
tion of criminal suspects based on information provided by DNA pro-
files—the topic which will form the basis for this chapter. In particular, this 
chapter addresses two emerging technologies in the field of forensic genet-
ics: familial searching and forensic DNA phenotyping. The first refers to 
searches conducted in DNA databases to identify criminal suspects through 
their connection with relatives. Forensic DNA phenotyping is a set of 
techniques that allow inferring genetic ancestry and externally visible char-
acteristics of criminal suspects on the basis of a DNA sample.
The ongoing development of these emergent DNA technologies repre-
sents a historical change in the presence of forensic genetic technologies in 
the criminal justice system. Firstly, because it shifts the focus of forensic 
science from the construction of evidence towards the generation of intel-
ligence valuable to criminal investigations (Wienroth, 2018a). Secondly, 
such emergent DNA technologies move the locus from individualization, 
that is, identification of specific individuals, towards collectivization. It 
does so by clustering “suspect” populations which share biological links, 
genetic ancestry and/or externally visible characteristics. It is a process 
which the sociologist Simon Cole describes as the “convergence of indi-
vidual and collective identification” (Cole, 2018, p. 2).
Familial sEarching in ForEnsic dna daTabasEs
Familial searching is a term1 generally refers to searches conducted in 
forensic DNA databases to identify criminal suspects using their genetic 
connection to biological relatives (Debus-Sherrill & Field, 2019; Granja 
& Machado, 2019; Haimes, 2006; Kim, Mammo, Siegel, & Katsanis, 
1 Other authors have proposed terms such as “low stringency search” (Gabel, 2010) or 
“genetic proximity testing” (Prainsack, 2010, p.  29) to describe this investigative 
technique.
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2011; Suter, 2010). Therefore, familial searching usually refers to a pro-
cess through which a DNA profile that does not match any other profile 
contained in a criminal DNA database is subjected to a new analysis, in 
order to determine whether there are close matches. If such partial matches 
exist, it is probable that the profile obtained at the crime scene or from the 
victim(s) belongs to a close relative of the person in the database—usually 
parents, children or siblings.
One variation of such searches may occur when relatives of potential 
suspects are found among the DNA profiles collected by intelligence-led 
DNA massive screenings (Thomas, 2006). Another variant of familial 
searching might also occur when investigators find an inadvertent partial 
match while looking for a perfect correspondence between a certain DNA 
profile and the biological material found at a crime scene (Murphy, 2010, 
p. 9)—what Sara Debus-Sherrill and Michael Field call “partial matching” 
(Debus-Sherrill & Field, 2019). The term familial searching in this chap-
ter aims to encapsulate all its variations.
Familial searching in forensic DNA databases was first implemented in 
the UK in 2002 (Haimes, 2006; Prainsack, 2010) and its use has been 
expanding to other countries. The Netherlands and France introduced 
legislation that allows the use of this investigative technique (Maguire, 
McCallum, Storey, & Whitaker, 2014) and, more recently, Germany has 
also approved the use of familial searching in intelligence-led DNA mas-
sive screenings (Criminal Code of Conduct—StPO §81h). In other EU 
countries, the situation remains unclear, although there are records of 
criminal cases that involved the use of relatives’ DNA to search for crimi-
nal suspects in countries such as Spain, Poland (Dettlaff-Kakol & 
Pawlowski, 2002) and Italy (Jones, 2015). Nevertheless, familial search-
ing remains unregulated in most EU countries.
Beyond Europe, familial searching in forensic DNA databases was for-
mally adopted by New Zealand and prohibited in Australia and Canada 
(Flaus, 2013; Thomas, 2006). The same kind of differentiation is found in 
the US, where familial searching is not conducted on a national level. On 
March 2008, the FBI determined that individual states should determine 
familial searching regulations. Following this decision, California was the 
first state to implement a policy for familial searching in 2008, followed by 
the state of Colorado in 2009. In 2011, Virginia also approved regulations 
on familial DNA searches, followed by Texas. More recently, in 2017, 
New York State also approved the use of this investigative technique. In 
contrast, Maryland and Washington, DC, banned familial searching. 
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Additionally, some states have implemented specific regulations permit-
ting partial match disclosure, such as Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, 
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, Washington State and Wyoming 
(Kim et al., 2011).
In countries where familial searching in forensic DNA databases is reg-
ulated, guidelines are typically restrictive and allow its use only in certain 
criminal cases which are considered serious and difficult to solve through 
other means (Chamberlain, 2012). For example, in the UK, familial 
searches conducted in the National DNA Database (NDNAD) are anal-
ysed according to a case-by-case approach and are dependent on permis-
sion from the Chairman of the NDNAD Strategy Board and, in some 
cases, from the victim (Maguire et al., 2014). Despite its restrictive use, 
such investigative techniques have thus far produced information that has 
helped to identify suspects, convict offenders and exonerate wrongfully 
convicted individuals, both in cold and in non-cold cases in several coun-
tries (Kim et  al., 2011). Nevertheless, the use of familial searching in 
forensic databases is still full of legal, ethical and social controversies 
(Chamberlain, 2012; García, Crespillo, & Yurrebaso, 2017; Haimes, 
2006; Kim et  al., 2011; Maguire et  al., 2014; Murphy, 2010; Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, 2007; Suter, 2010).
The academic and public debate around familial searching can be sum-
marized as framed around three main dimensions: genetic privacy, infor-
mation disclosure and reproduction of social inequalities. The first is 
related to how familial searching might constitute a “function creep” 
(Prainsack, 2010, pp. 28–30), inasmuch as it expands the reach of forensic 
databases to include, even if indirectly, other people who might never have 
had any direct contact with the criminal justice system (Bieber, Brenner, & 
Lazer, 2006; Epstein, 2009; Flaus, 2013; Suter, 2010; Thomas, 2006). 
This potential involvement of innocent people implies that this investiga-
tive technique increases indirect genetic surveillance on a certain group of 
individuals—relatives of potential suspects—primarily on the basis of their 
genetic association with someone (Bieber et al., 2006; Greely, Riordan, 
Garrison, & Mountain, 2006; Haimes, 2006; Kim et  al., 2011; Lazer, 
2008; Murphy, 2010). By extension, the expansion of the reach of foren-
sic databases also fosters a debate about the rights and duties of the 
“genetic informant”, that is, the person whose sample is a partial match 
with the crime scene sample and who, unintentionally, implicates family 
members in criminal investigations (Gabel, 2010; Murphy, 2010; Suter, 
2010; Williams & Johnson, 2006, p. 16).
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The second dimension concerns the latent risk of familial searching 
disclosing information. This might relate to either the absence or the exis-
tence of genetic relations (Haimes, 2006; Kim et  al., 2011; Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, 2007; Suter, 2010) and/or to the involvement with 
the criminal justice system that remained unknown to others.
The third dimension regards the broader social implications of familial 
searching, in particular its potential to reinforce dominant views about the 
alleged prevalence of criminality within certain families (Gabel, 2010, 
p. 21; Haimes, 2006) and/or to further amplify inequalities. When con-
ducted in forensic DNA databases, this investigative technique searches 
for potential suspects on a pre-established pool that generally overrepre-
sents certain groups and social categories that are most affected by the 
actions of the criminal justice system, such as racial and ethnic minorities 
(Chow-White & Duster, 2011; Duster, 2003; Skinner, 2013). In this 
sense, familial searching might end up reproducing the criminalization of 
certain social groups (Bieber et  al., 2006; Epstein, 2009; Flaus, 2013; 
Greely et al., 2006; Grimm, 2007; Kim et al., 2011; Lazer, 2008; Murphy, 
2010; Suter, 2010; Thomas, 2006).
Despite the lively debate that familial searching has been fomenting 
over the years, there are scarce empirical studies on this topic. One of them 
entails a National Survey of CODIS Laboratories in the US about policies 
and practices, as well as professionals’ perceptions, as they relate to familial 
searching (Debus-Sherrill & Field, 2019). Results show that while percep-
tions over familial searching were generally positive, with most respon-
dents (87%) believing that familial searching has potential to assist 
investigations, laboratories still shared a number of concerns related to 
familial searching. In addition to resource issues, which were indicated as 
the main concern, 83% of respondents working in a lab that conducts 
familial searching reported concerns over challenges to civil liberties, com-
pared to 30% of respondents working in labs that do not conduct such 
genetic technique (Debus-Sherrill & Field, 2019).
To date, only one empirical study on the topic of familial searching is 
known to have been undertaken in Europe. Based on a comparative study 
between the uses of familial searching in the UK and Poland, Rafaela 
Granja and Helena Machado outline the variability of familial searching in 
terms of meanings, uses and regulations (Granja & Machado, 2019). In 
the UK, familial searching is regulated by exceptionality and is mainly used 
for the identification of suspects in serious criminal cases. In Poland, famil-
ial searching is regulated within the framework of expanding the scope of 
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its application to the search and/or identification of missing persons. This 
chapter thereby shows how familial searching prescribes particular notions 
of social risks, public good and the accountability of the state. The ele-
ments that coproduce the different ways of perceiving ethical controver-
sies about familial searching carry with them the weight of sociohistorical 
and techno-political backgrounds, the influence of distinctive forms of 
state accountability as well as the contingent and circumstantial character 
of what each society considers the socially legitimate uses of genetic tech-
nologies (Granja & Machado, 2019).
long-rangE Familial sEarchEs in rEcrEaTional dna 
daTabasEs
The existing discussion on familial searching suffered a major turning 
point in 2018, following the aftermath of the Golden State Killer2 criminal 
investigation. In that case, criminal investigators used DNA from crime 
scenes and uploaded the genetic information into an online public-access 
DNA database, GEDmatch.3 Based on that search, officers found partial 
matches with the profile of the presumed suspect, which were assumed to 
belong to distant relatives. Following up the partial match, family trees 
were built upon the basis of several other sources (social media and other 
types of online records) and Joseph James DeAngelo, 72 years old, was 
identified as a suspect and his “abandoned” DNA4 was collected to 
 conduct further analysis. The result of the tests confirmed it matched the 
crime scene samples.5
2 The Golden State Killer is the name coined by Michelle McNamara to refer to a serial 
killer and rapist who committed at least 12 murders, and more than 50 rapes in California, 
USA, from 1974 to 1986. He is believed to be responsible for three crime sprees throughout 
California, each of which spawned a different nickname in the press (East Area Rapist and 
Original Night Stalker) before it became evident, through DNA analysis, that they were 
committed by the same person.
3 GEDmatch is an online public-access database where individuals with data originated 
from different testing companies can compare their DNA with others on the database in 
order to trace relatives. More information here: https://www.gedmatch.com/login1.php 
(last accessed 13 May 2019).
4 In the US the police can collect “abandoned DNA”, that is, a biological sample which has 
been left behind by the individual inadvertently or involuntarily, such as chewing gum or a 
tip of a cigarette. For a critical view of such procedures see Joh (2006).
5 Writing dated from September 2019; the case is currently under trial.
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The Golden State Killer criminal case was not the first one using long- 
range familial cases to assist criminal investigations (Erlich, Shor, Pe’er, & 
Carmi, 2018). However, since it became a widely discussed and high- 
profile criminal case, it completely reframed the discussion around the use 
of familial searching in criminal investigations. The case was considered by 
Nature one of the scientific events that shaped the year of 2018 (Abbott 
et al., 2018). Barbara Rae-Venter, a genealogist who helped to identify the 
Golden State Killer, was distinguished by the same journal as one of the 
“Ten people who mattered this year”. According to Time, Barbara Rae- 
Venter “has provided law enforcement with its most revolutionary tool 
since the advent of forensic DNA testing in the 1980s” (Holes, 2019).
The use of non-forensic DNA databases for criminal investigation pur-
poses is not a new phenomenon. There are a few criminal cases where 
information stored, for example, in medical DNA databases was used to 
solve a criminal case.6 However, the Golden State Killer criminal case led 
to the first reports of recreational DNA databases being used in such 
enquiries. That is, databases held for commercial purposes—the so-called 
direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing—to which citizens voluntarily 
upload their DNA in order to know about their ancestry and other genetic 
information, such as health issues (Abel, 2018; Borry, Cornel, & Howard, 
2010; Chow-White et al., 2018; Horowitz, Saperstein, Little, Maiers, & 
Hollenbach, 2019).
In the aftermath of the Golden State Killer investigation, other criminal 
cases have been showing the increasing use of long-range familial searches 
in recreational DNA databases, with the purpose of accommodating the 
possibility of searching for criminal suspects. According to Erlich et  al. 
(2018), between April and August 2018, 13 criminal cases in the US were 
solved through such searches. A significant portion of those had the 
involvement of Parabon NanoLabs, a company offering forensic services 
such as genetic genealogy, kinship inference and forensic DNA phenotyp-
ing (in this respect see also Wienroth, 2018a). In a more recent publica-
tion, members of the company refer to more than 30 law enforcement 
cases7 solved by them and their collaborators, such as Barbara Rae-Venter 
and law enforcement agencies (Greytak, Moore, & Armentrout, 2019). 
6 In Sweden, in 2003, forensic access to a medical biobank (PKU biobank—diagnostics) 
was authorized as part of the murder investigation of Anna Lindh (Swedish foreign 
minister).
7 Through 31/1/19.
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As a result, the use of long-range familial searches in recreational DNA 
databases has been the subject of highly visible public and regulatory con-
troversy, posing new lines of enquiry on the uses of DNA data in the gov-
ernance of crime. In the rest of this section, we will briefly summarize 
some of the topics under discussion.
Familial searching in forensic DNA databases uses autosomal short tan-
dem repeats (STRs), the so-called junk genes that presumably hold little 
value other than for identification. Using that method, the investigative 
technique might, at best, identify close biological relatives (siblings, par-
ents or children). In opposition, long-range familial searches in recre-
ational DNA databases use single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), 
which are characterized by their informational richness (Greytak et  al., 
2019; Kennett, 2019; Murphy, 2018).8 As a result, that kind of use makes 
more informative data available to law enforcement, while also signifi-
cantly expanding the network of people that might be affected by such 
procedures (Murphy, 2018). In this respect it is relevant to note that a 
study conducted by Yaniv Erlich and his colleagues estimates that “about 
60% of the searches for individuals of European descent will result in a 
third cousin or a closer match, which can allow their identification using 
demographic identifiers” (Erlich et  al., 2018). The use of long-range 
familial searches in recreational DNA databases thereby significantly 
expands the scope and impact of genetic surveillance.
Forensic DNA databases and recreational DNA databases also signifi-
cantly differ in another aspect that has become increasingly relevant in the 
governance of crime. While the first tends to overrepresent the groups and 
social categories most affected by the actions of the criminal justice system, 
such as racial and ethnic minorities (Skinner, 2013), the latter is mainly 
composed of individuals with a North European genetic background 
(Erlich et al., 2018). This, therefore, implies that genetic surveillance is no 
longer restricted to the “management of those already deemed criminal” 
(Williams & Johnson, 2004, p. 11): nowadays it also  encapsulates individu-
als that might never have had contact with the criminal justice system before.
Another topic of discussion regarding long-range familial searches in 
recreational DNA databases relates to the lack of governance and over-
8 In addition to this, since DTC companies obtain DNA from spit kits or cheek swabs, 
DNA profiles are always based on a large amount of high-quality single-source DNA.  In 
opposition, forensic DNA samples might face several obstacles to an analysis by having only 
a small amount of degraded DNA and/or being mixed with DNA from other individuals 
(Greytak et al., 2019).
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sight. In the aftermath of the Golden State Killer criminal case, several 
private companies specialized in providing direct-to-consumer DNA tests 
and other online related resources updated their terms of use. However, 
due to the lack of regulatory norms, several companies in the market 
reacted differently. Some companies had decided to not allow uploads in 
their databases, stating that their data is not accessible to law enforcement 
unless a judicial request is made (Greytak et al., 2019; Kennett, 2019). 
However, the private company FamilyTreeDNA admitted in February 
2019 that, without informing its users, it allowed the FBI to upload 
genetic profiles created from crime scenes and corpses. After the compa-
ny’s president, Bennett Greenspan, apologized for not revealing it sooner 
to its clients, the company produced a TV advertisement urging consum-
ers to help them catch criminals. The television spot9 asked anyone who 
had made a direct-to-consumer DNA test to upload a copy so that law 
enforcement could spot any connections to DNA found at crime scenes.
Finally, GEDmatch, the online public-access database used in the 
Golden State Killer case, changed their Terms of Service. Since May 2019 
users have to explicitly opt in for their DNA profiles to be included in law 
enforcement searches to identify remains and perpetrators of violent 
crimes, defined as homicides or sexual assaults (Kennett, 2019; Moore, 
2016). Although it is acceptable to expect that users of such databases are 
currently informed about its wide implications, such policies do not secure 
consent from the biological relatives that might, unexpectedly, become 
implicated into a criminal investigation.
Therefore, the different approaches taken by different companies and 
other online resources mobilized for long-range familial searches exem-
plify the lack of restrictions and constraints currently under place to bal-
ance the right of individuals to genetic privacy against the desire to 
apprehend criminals (Murphy, 2018). In addition to such a scenario, 
another layer of this lack of governance and oversight is linked to the inex-
istence of accreditation, professionalization and accountability for geneal-
ogists. As a result, individuals with very different degrees of expertise 
might be involved in such procedures, which poses severe ethical issues 
(Kennett, 2019).
Within such a complex scenario, it is clear that while familial searching 
in forensic DNA databases is framed by a series of inclusion and exclusion 
criteria that impose some safeguards in terms of genetic privacy (Granja & 
9 https://www.technologyreview.com/the-download/613232/help-us-catch-killers-is-
now-the-new-advertising-angle-for-dna-companies/ (last accessed on 29 April 2019).
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Machado, 2019; Haimes, 2006; Kim et al., 2011; Murphy, 2010, 2018), 
private companies have extensive databases, with few restrictions and inex-
istent governance. Long-range familial searches in recreational DNA data-
bases thus offer a way of circumventing long-established protocols in 
forensic DNA databases.
Despite such a spirited debate taking place, little is yet known about 
how the public perceives such new avenues of criminal investigation. In 
the aftermath of the Golden State Killer criminal case, a survey of 1587 US 
residents found that the majority of respondents supported police searches 
of genetic websites that identify genetic relatives (79%) and the disclosure 
of direct-to-consumer genetic testing customer information to the police 
(62%), as well as the creation of fake profiles of individuals by the police on 
genealogy websites (65%). However, respondents were significantly more 
supportive of these activities to identify perpetrators of violent crimes, per-
petrators of crimes against children and missing persons cases (Guerrini, 
Robinson, Petersen, & McGuire, 2018).
Old and new debates over the use of familial searches for criminal inves-
tigation purposes therefore shed light on how we are no longer solely 
discussing an interaction between science and law. The advent of long- 
range familial searches in recreational databases puts in focus how police 
forces, scientific experts, private companies, media and consumers increas-
ingly interact. Such scenario thus brings to the table issues of trust and 
distrust, citizens’ understanding of genetic science, uncontrolled access to 
citizens’ genetic data and expansion of affected populations. Although 
such uses of recreational databases are, for now, mainly restricted to the 
US context, this type of databases are increasingly expanding worldwide. 
As a result, it is possible that law enforcement agencies in other countries 
will consider using such investigative technique.
ForEnsic dna PhEnoTyPing
Forensic DNA phenotyping can be broadly described as a constellation of 
techniques10 that aims to infer externally visible physical features in 
humans—eye, hair and skin colour—and continental-based biogeographi-
10 We use the term “constellation” to define forensic DNA phenotyping and outline the set 
of different genetic techniques that might be used to infer externally visible characteristics—
such as eye, skin and hair colour—as well as information about biogeographic ancestry. In 
addition, the use of this term also aims to highlight how such techniques can be used either 
jointly or separately.
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cal ancestry of criminal suspects, through the analysis of biological materi-
als collected at crime scenes11 (Daniel et al., 2015; Kayser, 2015; Kayser & 
de Knijff, 2011; Kayser & Schneider, 2009). Forensic DNA phenotyping 
technologies have been applied in various jurisdictions in a limited number 
of high-profile cases (Wienroth, 2018a, p. 4) with the aim of providing 
intelligence for criminal investigations.
The potentialities attributed to forensic DNA phenotyping in support-
ing criminal investigations show its added intelligence value by generating 
new leads when the DNA collected from crime scenes is not registered in 
forensic DNA databases and/or when there are no eyewitnesses available 
(Kayser, 2015).12 More particularly, forensic DNA phenotyping works by 
inferring to which group a particular individual might belong (i.e., a group 
of people with blue eyes and European ancestry). Within a criminal inves-
tigation, such type of data is translated by clustering a group of people 
who share a set of characteristics and considering them “a suspect popula-
tion” (M’charek, 2008).
The initial debate in the field of social sciences about this genetic tech-
nology has primarily focused on the socio-ethical challenges that might 
emerge from its use in the criminal justice system. For the purposes of this 
chapter, we outline three domains that have been extensively debated. The 
first regards the high expectations placed upon the potential of forensic 
DNA phenotyping. Contrary to what is often disseminated in popular 
media when this topic is touched upon, forensic geneticists argue that 
forensic DNA phenotyping tests cannot “predict” the external character-
istics of a person or his/her ancestry with fool-proof certainty. Such inter-
pretation of the potential of forensic DNA phenotyping might lead to 
severe miscarriages of justice. According to such professionals, forensic 
DNA phenotyping’s potential lies in the inference of individual’s pheno-
typic characteristics within a certain degree of probabilistic likelihood 
11 For the purposes of this chapter, we excluded the potential uses of this technology in the 
search and/or identification of missing persons.
12 Legislation about the use of forensic DNA phenotyping differs widely across Europe. It 
is only explicitly regulated in the Netherlands (Samuel & Prainsack, 2018a, 2018b). In other 
countries, legislation is either implicit or absent, which implies that it might be differently 
interpreted by experts and practitioners. As a result, forensic DNA phenotyping is applied in 
countries such as Spain and the UK and considered as forbidden in others, namely, Germany, 
Belgium and Austria. Nevertheless, there are ongoing debates and proposals on the regula-
tion of forensic DNA phenotyping in both Germany and Switzerland (Samuel & Prainsack, 
2018a).
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(Samuel & Prainsack, 2018a). These expanding high expectations are fur-
ther complicated by the claims made by the company Parabon NanoLabs, 
which markets forensic DNA phenotyping as a technology able to produce 
facial composite images of potential suspects, including facial features and 
morphology. Claims of that kind have been extensively criticized by crimi-
nal justice stakeholders and scientific practitioners who research and work 
in the field of forensic DNA phenotyping (Wienroth, 2018b).
The second area of debate regarding forensic DNA phenotyping that 
has been receiving wide attention refers to the problematic nature of 
defining populations through genetics. In particular, scholars in social sci-
ences outline the need to problematize how the genetic reinscription of 
race (El-Haj, 2007) might play out in the everyday practices of criminal 
investigations. That is, how socially constructed notions of “race” and 
“ethnicity” might be translated into biological characteristics and vice 
versa. For example, stating that the criminal suspect is possibly from 
“African ancestry” is probably going to be translated and materialized by 
law enforcement, justice stakeholders and the general public into “the 
suspect is probably black” (Samuel & Prainsack, 2018a). In this sense, 
disclosing information related to biogeographical ancestry is a sensitive 
issue, as the forensic distinction of populations by continents or popula-
tion groups can easily lead to inaccurate socially constructed associations 
between these and categories of race and ethnicity (M’charek, 2008; 
Vailly, 2017).
In addition, the act of revealing that a certain criminal suspect is from a 
racial or ethnic minority might further compound discriminatory practices 
against already vulnerable groups. Forensic DNA phenotyping might, 
thus, present a risk of renewing existing forms of stigmatization and creat-
ing new forms of racial profiling that further exacerbate the criminaliza-
tion of certain groups, which are already the most affected by the actions 
of the criminal justice system, such as racial and ethnic minorities 
(M’charek, Toom, & Prainsack, 2012).
The third area under discussion concerns the idea that forensic DNA 
phenotyping might be used in criminal investigations as a “biological wit-
ness” (Kayser, 2015). Such a concept encapsulates the notion that forensic 
DNA phenotyping techniques might overcome the limitations of informa-
tion presented by eyewitness testimonies, which are perceived as fragile, 
pervaded with emotions, motivations, subjectivities and information gaps. 
When reacting to that argument, several social scientists have been outlin-
ing, on the one hand, the risks of perceiving science and technology as 
 H. MACHADO AND R. GRANJA
97
immune to social bias, and, on the other, the socially decontextualized 
nature of information provided by forensic DNA phenotyping, especially 
when directly compared with eyewitness accounts that often provide con-
text about the events of a crime (Toom et al., 2016).
In addition to such debates about the ethical, legal and social implica-
tions of forensic DNA phenotyping, the topic has been increasingly raising 
interest from scholars. Richard Tutton and his colleagues have critically 
explored the UK Border Agency’s initiative of using genetic testing to 
discover ancestry and geographical origins and isotope testing13 to cor-
roborate asylum seekers’ accounts of their nationality (Tutton, Hauskeller, 
& Sturdy, 2014). The authors outline how such technologies deprive indi-
viduals of the right to tell their own stories by employing biological cate-
gories as a proxy for the social category of nationality (Tutton et al., 2014, 
p.  746) and further aggravate the criminalization of asylum applicants. 
Another study, by Joëlle Vailly, analysed the power relations which emerged 
in France in relation to forensic DNA phenotyping through an analysis of 
the discourses of judges and prosecutors, political officials and managers in 
biotechnology companies. The author shows how such power relations 
emerged between different social actors, according to their different con-
nections and affiliations to ethics, politics and law (Vailly, 2017).
Another recent study has addressed the views of forensic geneticists 
about forensic DNA phenotyping by focusing on how scientists engage 
with a set of anticipatory practices (Wienroth, 2018a). Mathias Wienroth 
explores the promissory aspects of forensic DNA phenotyping, along with 
its epistemic and operational aspects—such as management of expecta-
tions, negotiation of legislative barriers and integration into existing 
 technologies. In a different piece of work, Wienroth also analyses how 
forensic DNA phenotyping is entrenched in the political economy of 
forensic genetics, anchored in the intersection of scientific ethics, forensic 
practices and commercial resources. Drawing on the case of Parabon 
NanoLabs’ DNA photo-fits, the author outlines how scientists’ ethical rea-
soning about the development and use of forensic DNA phenotyping 
tackles issues of validation, epistemic transparency, science legitimacy and 
commercial value in ways that continuously reassert scientific primacy over 
commercial, legal and judicial concerns (Wienroth, 2018b).
Gabrielle Samuel and Barbara Prainsack have also recently written pub-
lications about forensic DNA phenotyping. In one of such publications 
13 Isotope testing analyses the way different environments may leave distinctive traces in 
individuals’ bodies (Tutton et al., 2014, pp. 744–745).
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the authors address the views of actors with a professional stake in forensic 
DNA phenotyping about the benefits and problems associated with the 
prospective use of the technology. More particularly, Samuel and Prainsack 
show how respondents do not “view forensic DNA phenotyping as a tech-
nology with clear boundaries that ‘raised’ ethical issues. Instead, forensic 
DNA phenotyping was portrayed as a heterogeneous set of practices and 
material technologies that were partly shaped by ethical considerations” 
(Samuel & Prainsack, 2018a, pp. 3–4), which include issues of validity, 
reliability and discrimination. In another publication, the authors explore 
how civil society stakeholders strike a balance between the potential use-
fulness of the use of forensic DNA phenotyping and the various ethical 
and social considerations (Samuel & Prainsack, 2019).
Finally, David Skinner has addressed the topic of why race prediction 
within forensic DNA phenotyping is particularly problematic. The author 
discusses the implications of and for forensic DNA phenotyping in the 
context of established social structural inequalities that affect minorities in 
the realm of police and justice (Skinner, 2018a). Moreover, the author 
also frames forensic DNA phenotyping as entrenched in wider significant 
changes in the use of race as an object of expert knowledge in science and 
policy-making (Skinner, 2018b).
Despite the still-evolving controversies on forensic DNA phenotyping 
in several countries, further development of intelligence-focused technol-
ogies is being equated: a recent publication, for instance, argues in favour 
of broadening DNA-based forensic intelligence by coupling it with epig-
enomic lifestyle predictions to find unknown perpetrators of crimes who 
are not identifiable using current forensic DNA profiling (Vidaki & Kayser, 
2017, 2018). Building upon the concept and possibilities of epigenetics 
(covered in Chap. 3), some forensic geneticists are thereby considering 
that future perspectives of forensic epigenomics might include the ability 
to predict smoking, drinking and drug-use habits, the type of diet fol-
lowed, physical activity levels, body size/shape, geographic region of resi-
dence as well as socioeconomic status (Vidaki & Kayser, 2017).
concluding rEmarks
This chapter aimed to critically explore the complex politics of legitima-
tion and contestation (Skinner, 2018b) that frame the development and 
consolidation of DNA technologies focused on generating intelligence, 
such as familial searching and forensic DNA phenotyping. Such technolo-
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gies represent particularly interesting cases to question the role of forensic 
genetics in the governance of crime. Firstly, despite the association with 
notions of a “gold standard” that frames forensic science, recent and still 
developing technologies present ongoing issues about their usefulness, 
reliability and regulatory framework. Nevertheless, developers and advo-
cates for its adoption strongly draw upon a narrative of objectivity to bol-
ster its adoption, further development and expansion (Wienroth, 2018a). 
Secondly, by constructing suspicion as collective, rather than individual, 
such technologies also bring an additional layer to issues of discrimination. 
Finally, such technologies are also clearly outlining how modern science 
will unravel under the aegis of the market, which brings complex conse-
quences and contingencies for human rights.
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion
Abstract This chapter succinctly summarizes the contents presented in 
the book, highlighting the main arguments. In particular, we revisit the 
various modalities and roles of forensic genetics in the governance of crime 
in contemporary societies. Additionally, we reflect upon paths for the 
future of research in the field of the social studies of forensic genetics.
Keywords Forensic genetics • Governance of crime • Future 
investigation
Book Summary
The main goal of this book is to propose a sociological approach to the 
role and place of forensic genetics in the governance of crime in contem-
porary societies. The presented themes are a reaction to the generalized 
enthusiasm generated around the potential of DNA technologies. We 
have attempted to explore in depth the complexity inherent in this social 
phenomenon.
Each chapter highlights a singular dimension of how forensic genetics 
are used in the governance of crime. As a whole, the different dimensions 
being analysed point to fundamental reconfigurations in social relation-
ships, as well as to the ethical and legal implications of the use of DNA 
technologies in criminal justice systems. Among other aspects, the use of 
DNA technologies has implications for the way societies attribute  meaning 
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and classify and conceive the human body, the genetic links between indi-
viduals and groups and the physical appearance of individuals and popula-
tions. It also has a profound impact on the practices of several professional 
groups, from forensic geneticists, to police forces, criminal investigators, 
diverse stakeholders and the citizens. Finally, the use of DNA technologies 
in the criminal justice system has diverse and deep implications in the way 
institutions and public policies manage expectations for the governance of 
crime, namely in terms of police and judicial cooperation initiatives 
whereby DNA data and information are exchanged to support transna-
tional criminal investigations.
The considerations developed in this book begin by illustrating the role 
of sociology in the study of the micro/macro and subjective/objective 
dimensions of the social processes and dynamic generated by the presence 
of DNA technologies in the criminal justice systems (Chap. 2). Such 
dimensions provide context, norms and values to the social actions of het-
erogeneous actors, namely: laboratory technicians, forensic genetics 
researchers, police forces, judges, prosecutors, attorneys, jurors, profes-
sional organizations, supervising entities, non-governmental entities, poli-
ticians, criminals, victims and citizens in general. Based upon this polysemic 
framing, we describe the emergence and consolidation of social studies for 
forensic genetics. In particular, we explore the scientific and legal contro-
versies that have marked the creation, stabilization and consolidation of 
the protocols, quality patterns, expert communities and legislation focused 
on the use of DNA technologies in the criminal justice system. Such an 
analysis is followed by a summary description of the way several research 
methods and techniques (document analysis, interviews, surveys, observa-
tion, focus groups, among others) have been used in this field of study, 
while also providing a multifaceted image of this phenomenon.
Subsequently, to contextualize the broader scenarios that transcend the 
application of forensic genetics in the justice system, we engage in a critical 
debate about the biological explanations of criminal behaviour. Throughout 
Chap. 3, we emphasize how it proved to be particularly relevant to trace 
the field’s history, from biological determinism—outlining its severe 
implications for individuals classified as “born criminals”—until the most 
recent biogenetic explanations. The current development of epigenetics 
and neurobiology frame the new discussions about nature versus nurture, 
fostering new ways to act upon certain social groups considered as risky, 
even in the absence of any deviant or criminal behaviour.
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The next two chapters of the book frame and describe the way DNA 
technologies have been used in courts and in the field of criminal investi-
gation. In Chap. 4, we highlight the idiosyncrasies of the various epistemic 
cultures involved in the chain of custody through which DNA circulates 
from the crime scene to the courts of law. The risks associated with the 
high expectations placed upon DNA potential to solve criminal cases are 
explored in detail. We also analyse the role of media in the dissemination 
of notions of DNA as an “infallible” technology. Another theme that mer-
its our attention is the creation and expansion of criminal databases con-
taining thousands of DNA profiles, where we also note the ethical and 
human rights issues stemming from this phenomenon. Finally, Chap. 5 
also provides the reader with a brief discussion about Big Data in the con-
text of the growing collection of data in the present information society, 
more particularly by reflection upon how Big Data can potentially support 
criminal investigations due to its ability to predict and anticipate risks.
Taking as the starting point the consolidation and expansion of forensic 
genetics in the governance of crime, in terms of both impact and reach, 
the last chapters of the book are dedicated to debating the way DNA tech-
nologies have proliferated in contemporary societies while finding new 
frameworks for application on the justice system. One example of those 
configurations is linked to the growing interoperability between forensic 
DNA databases, which is the topic of discussion in Chap. 6.
The interoperability of forensic DNA databases is illustrated by the cre-
ation of the Prüm system, which aims to control and surveil irregular 
mobilities within the European Union by exchanging data transnationally. 
In this regard, we outline how the transnational exchange of DNA data 
emerged as a project whose goal was aimed towards overcoming the social 
and political disparities in the European Union. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that such a goal of overcoming disparities through technological standard-
ization is nowadays paired with the consolidation of a system of wider 
social sorting that highlights several geopolitical tensions.
Chapter 7 focuses on the expansion of the use of forensic genetic tech-
nologies by discussing the current development of emergent DNA tech-
nologies that make it possible to generate intelligence to search for criminal 
suspects. We explore the implications of the use of particular technologies 
like familial searching and forensic DNA phenotyping. Such technologies 
aim to help criminal investigations to place their attention on specific sus-
pect groups, thereby moving forensic genetics from individual identifica-
tion towards the collectivization of suspicion. In addition, these emerging 
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technologies also showcase the co-evolving relation between science, jus-
tice and the market. As a result, the governance of data has become the 
focal point of debates, coexisting and reconfiguring older debates focused 
upon topics such as genetic privacy, ownership of personal data and data 
usage consent.
PointS for reflection
This book shows how, by becoming a tool in service of justice, the applica-
tion of DNA technologies entails the creation of new configurations able 
to connect identities, perspectives and risk notions (Lynch, Cole, McNally, 
& Jordan, 2008). From the standpoint of risk society theories (Beck, 
1944; Giddens, 1990), the mechanisms for social control and manage-
ment of public trust used by the State are significantly dependent on two 
vectors: on the one hand, the accumulation, computerization and han-
dling of massive amounts of data about the citizens. In several fields of 
social life, we can see a proliferation of practices that validate the participa-
tion of citizens in technological processes of “identity securitization”. 
Such processes include biosurveillance mechanisms and identity verifica-
tion/confirmation technologies that use DNA technologies. On the other 
hand, another vector of the social control mechanisms and management 
of public trust used by the State regards the technological and scientific 
innovations applicable to the criminal justice system.
The DNA technologies analysed in this book reveal precisely the accel-
eration of the reconfiguration of classic control mechanisms. According to 
several authors (see, e.g., Aas, 2004; Lyon, 2002, 2004; Tsianos & Kuster, 
2016; Van der Ploeg, 2003), it is a matter of configuring knowledge about 
populations and their respective bodies into a language that can be trans-
lated and read by machines (Dodge & Kitchin, 2004). Such knowledge is 
also configured as transferable in information patterns that can be orga-
nized into movable “packages” by various social control agents, such as 
criminal investigation institutions.
This new “body ontology” can be seen in the debate about the role of 
forensic genetics in the governance of crime, according to a principle that 
upholds the right to privacy, which is closely connected to the configura-
tion of the body’s information. We are seeing the emergence of a type of 
genetic privacy that is no longer linked to intrusion on the individual’s 
body, but to the State’s intrusion on the information “stored” on the 
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genetic code. A close look into such processes also highlights how the 
reproduction of inequality and social differentiation is growingly linked to 
technological control and strengthened by a culture focused on security. 
Within this context, a part of the population, whether by misfortune, their 
origin or their behaviour, are excluded as “non-citizens”, “failed citizens” 
or “anti-citizens” (Aas, 2011; Rose, 2000).
Thus, the control of populations using genetic technologies is a gover-
nance feature of contemporary societies, made possible by a type of sur-
veillance that doesn’t necessarily look for people or behaviours assessed as 
deviant. Instead, it searches for preexisting exclusion parameters (in a risk 
containment logic) which are determined by identifiable patterns in the 
databases—what Roger Clarke (1988) called dataveillance (see also Lyon, 
2001). The identification is not limited to the (potential) offender, but 
also encapsulates groups and identities which, due to their traits, become 
suspicious to the database. We are referring to “statistical suspects” (Cole 
& Lynch, 2006), considered as such for reasons tied to probability inci-
dence and anchored on a discourse that is seemingly uninterested in the 
ethical/moral connotations of this categorization.
The context and social implications of the uses of genetic technologies 
in the criminal justice system provide the basis for addressing these tech-
nologies as an integral element of “surveillant assemblage” (Haggerty & 
Ericson, 2000). The “surveillant assemblage” represents a vast set of inter-
connected systems and surveillance practices, which is continuously in flux 
and devoid of a relevant and concrete hierarchy. This “genetic surveil-
lance” therefore organizes a global transformation of State structures and 
societies around technological and monitoring devices. This way, new 
concepts of identity and body take shape, as well as a stronger form of citi-
zens’ participation and engagement with the ethical and political implica-
tions of such technologies.
Consequently, society’s organization around increasing flows of infor-
mation creates new conditions for emancipation by breaking down tradi-
tional power structures into a fluid dynamics. At the same time, we can see 
a reinforcement of the centrality and symbolic power of scientific knowl-
edge, particularly in the field of bioscience. It serves as the foundation 
stone for new truth-producing regimes, which will simultaneously inte-
grate political power and judicial initiatives in a way that is liable to rein-
force the creation of social inequality.
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tracing new PathS for the future of reSearch
As noted throughout this book, the use of forensic genetics in the gover-
nance of crime is a rapidly growing field, whether in terms of the scale of 
its activity or in the sophistication of the information that is collected, 
extracted, analysed, worked upon and used. Among the elements develop-
ing and changing at an accelerated rate, and which consequently deserve 
specific studies to explore in depth their social, ethical, legal and political 
implications, we highlight two phenomena: the geopolitics of DNA and 
the expansion of commercial information repositories mobilized for crimi-
nal investigation purposes.
DNA geopolitics regards the way the different uses and meanings given 
to DNA vary according to different national contexts. As this book indi-
cates, the DNA databases with the largest size and sophistication are based 
on the richest, most technologically advanced countries. However, politi-
cal forces linked to neoliberalism and security-focused ideologies have 
imposed on countries with less economic and scientific resources, as well 
as disparate models for regulation, legislation and organization, the obli-
gation to implement forensic DNA databases. Therefore, it has become 
urgent to understand the different ways that political, social and economic 
power intervene in the use of forensic genetics for the governance of 
crime. To that effect, it’s necessary to expand the analysis beyond the pio-
neering and/or more developed countries in terms of forensic genetics, 
understanding the way underdeveloped countries in the field of forensic 
genetics perceive DNA technologies’ potential and risks.
Finally, the rapid expansion of commercial information repositories 
developed by private companies represents a sharp dilemma for those 
responsible for regulatory frameworks and ethical issues. One significant 
example is the “recreational databases” that try to infer, using DNA, the 
biogeographical ancestry and/or predisposition towards certain health 
conditions. In a context where social values and scientific legitimacy are 
(re)negotiated, recreational genetic databases show a tension between 
optimism regarding the techno-scientific potential to solve complex crimi-
nal cases and the public’s distrust about the ethical limits of science and 
technology. Moreover, the use of such databases in the field of forensics 
underscores the emergence of new social arenas where police forces, scien-
tists, private companies, the media and the general public actively interact. 
These social processes create new possibilities in forensic science that are 
based upon considerations that balance the benefits of identifying criminal 
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offenders and the undesirable collateral damage of threatening 
genetic privacy.
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Big Data Technique that aggregates and analyses a huge amount of data, 
converting it into algorithms, numerically categorized and identified by 
means of a calculated index, from which information may be extracted.
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) Chemical material that makes up each 
molecule found on chromosomes, carrying the genetic information of 
each organism. It typically contains different information in different 
individuals.
DNA evidence Information produced based on DNA technologies that 
is intended as a probative component to be assessed in a court of crimi-
nal justice.
DNA technologies Set of techniques applied to DNA to produce infor-
mation about a particular biological sample. Encompasses techniques 
such as DNA profiling, but also emerging technologies such as familial 
searching and forensic DNA phenotyping.
Familial searching Process through which a DNA profile that does not 
match any other profile contained in a DNA database is subjected to a 
new analysis to determine whether there are close matches. If such par-
tial matches exist, it is probable that the profile belongs to a biological 
relative of the person in the database.
Forensic DNA databases They involve collection, storage and use of 
DNA profiles from nominated suspects, convicted offenders, victims, 
volunteers and other persons of interest to criminal investigation work. 
The aim is to compare profiles of individuals with profiles obtained 
from crime scene samples.
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Forensic DNA phenotyping Constellation of techniques that infers 
physical features, such as eye, skin and hair colour, as well as informa-
tion about the biogeographic ancestry, from biological materials.
Genetic profile Information extracted from biological samples that aim 
to define the uniqueness of a given individual from the biological point 
of view.
Intelligence-led DNA massive screenings/DNA dragnets Procedures 
that involve collecting DNA samples from “volunteers” who are mem-
bers of a certain population to search for potential suspects among that 
population’s members by matching samples with those collected from 
a crime scene/victim.
Match/Hit A “match” or a “hit” are both used equally to describe a cor-
respondence between DNA profiles discovered by a database search at 
a given moment in time.
Prüm Convention/Prüm Decisions/Prüm system The term Prüm 
Convention refers to the 2005 Convention involving seven countries, 
the term Prüm Decisions refers to the Council Decision that estab-
lished the mandatory nature of transnational data exchange for all EU 
Member States, and the term Prüm system refers to the actual network 
of European Union countries exchanging DNA data.
Prüm Step 1 and Step 2 The Prüm System functions in two different 
steps. Step 1 refers to the moment when a search is made in a national 
database for a DNA profile retrieved from a crime scene and no match 
is found; the Prüm Decisions permits the DNA profile reference to be 
transmitted and searched in other Member States’ national databases. A 
notification is then sent to the original Member State informing it of a 
match or no match. If a match is identified, Step 2 occurs and further 
requests for information are processed through the existing police and/
or judicial channels.
